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NOTICE: An * indicates material not previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Russia: Public TV Reports Arrest of Yeltsin Campaign Figures

LD1906224696 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 2149 GMT 19 Jun 96

[Unscheduled special "Novosti" news program presented by Nelli Petkova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hello, we are broadcasting a special Russian Public TV news bulletin. According to our information, a statement made at his news conference yesterday by Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed about the existence of a plot — GKChP-3 — was unexpectedly confirmed today. On the personal instructions today of Mikhail Barsukov, director of the Federal Security Service, and Aleksandr Korzhakov, head of the president's security service, two leading staff members of President Yeltsin's election campaign were detained. They are Sergey Lisovskiy, who was involved in the campaign project, Vote or be a loser, and Arkadiy Yevstafyev, an aide and right-hand man of Anatoliy Chubays.

It is clear that these actions are directed at causing the collapse of the president's campaign at a critical moment before the second round of the presidential elections. It is apparent that these actions have the aim of creating an emergency situation in the country and having the presidential elections postponed, which General Korzhakov in particular publicly spoke about on 1 May. It is probable that yesterday's appointment of Aleksandr Lebed and his statement at his news conference of the existence of a plot made the heads of the special services speed up their previously planned action.

Our correspondents are now trying to obtain additional information on this matter. In this connection we will be on the air with the latest developments throughout the night and tomorrow morning. Await our reports.

Russia: NTV Chief Claims Security Service Trying To Prevent Elections

LD2006060196 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0508 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 Jun (Itar-Tass) — "Those who yesterday evening detained Sergey Lisovskiy and Arkadiy Yevstafyev, active participants in Boris Yeltsin's election campaign, did so with the intention of preventing the second round of the presidential elections," an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told today by Igor Malashenko, member of Boris Yeltsin's campaign staff and president of the NTV television company .

Malashenko said that shortly after 0100 GMT, he met Lisovskiy after he had been released. Lisovskiy told him that Federal Security Service (FSS) operatives had tried to get both from him and from Arkadiy Yevstafyev any kind of compromising material on the organizers of Boris Yeltsin's election campaign, specifically on Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Anatoliy Chubays, member of the president's campaign staff.

Malashenko states that Lisovskiy told him that as soon as NTV and Russian Public TV put out emergency bulletins on the detention of two members of the campaign staff, both detainees were immediately released.

When the FSS departed, they advised Lisovskiy and Yevstafyev "not to stir things up and to lie low." In other words, they wanted to carry out this operation silently and anonymously in order later to remove from Yeltsin's electoral campaign well-known people of high standing.

Russia: 'Sources' Report Arrests Connected With TV Corruption

LD2006042696 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 0400 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Our sources in the Federal Security Services indicate that the detention of Lisovskiy and Yevstafyev may be connected with investigations into corruption at the Russian Public Television Network. The sources would also not rule out the possibility that the detention could be connected with the investigation into the murder of Vladislav Listyev, the former managing director of Russian Public Television. The duty officer at the Federal Security Service administration for Moscow and Moscow Region, however, stated that he had no information on this subject.

Russia: Police Say Lisovskiy, Yevstafyev To Blame for Detention

LD2006120496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1135 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Itar-Tass) — A police source at the House of the Government told Itar-Tass today that Yeltsin's campaigners Sergey Lisovskiy and Arkadiy Yevstafyev, whose detention on Wednesday triggered a ballyhoo in the media and a chain reaction in the power structures, were to blame for what really happened.

The source said the two men were carrying an office copier packing box filled with foreign banknotes but would not present a pass required for taking valuables out of the building.

The ranking source said the guard acted by the book in stopping Lisovskiy and Yevstafyev and alerting the presidential security service.

Russia: Chernomyrdin Source Comments on Campaign Aides' Arrests

LD2006053596 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0500 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 20 Jun (Itar-Tass) — Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin learned about the detention by the power-wielding structures last night of two key figures in the presidential campaign to re-elect Boris Yeltsin, after he left the Government House and was already back home. An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this from a source close to the chairman of the Russian Government. The source also said the detention of at least one of the men, Arkadiy Yevstafyev, aide to Anatoliy Chubays who is one of the heads of the president's election campaign, was made at the Government House at about the same time Chernomyrdin was having a discussion with Gennadiy Zyuganov. Yevstafyev was taken to a room where a "lengthy conversation" was held with him. [passage omitted]

According to sources close to Boris Yeltsin's election campaign staff, the detention of Yevstafyev and Sergey Lisovskiy, known as the organizer of the "Vote or You Lose" campaign, was organized on the orders of Mikhail Barsukov, head of the Federal Security Service and Aleksandr Korzhakov, head of the President's Security Service. The two detainees have now been released.

Talking to an ITAR-TASS correspondent, the source said that according to Chernomyrdin, nothing threatened Lisovskiy's and Yevstafyev's personal safety.

Russia: Zyuganov Withholds Comment on Detention of Yeltsin Aides

LD2006075096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0730 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Interfax) — Leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and presidential hopeful Gennadiy Zyuganov has refused to comment on the detention of two members of President Boris Yeltsin's campaign committee.

"It remains unclear whether this is a political show or an alarm drill," Zyuganov said.

An INTERFAX correspondent asked Zyuganov Wednesday whether an unexpected turn of developments were likely, for example, moves to cancel the second round of the presidential elections or hinder the transfer of power in case he wins the presidential mandate. "No one will make such moves," said Zyuganov, nor will anyone dare violate existing legislation. [punctuation as received]

Russia: Yeltsin Campaign Figures Released From Detention

LD2006021496 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0200 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have been informed by the Moscow Russian Television Network's "Vesti" news program that early this morning, Sergey Lisovskiy and Arkadiy Yevstafyev were released.

Russia: Yevstafyev Interviewed on 11-Hour Arrest Ordeal

LD2006043996 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0400 GMT 20 Jun 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, our correspondent Aleksey Samoletov met Arkadiy Yevstafyev, who was released at 0300 [2300 GMT]:

[Begin recording] [A. Yevstafyev, senior official with B. Yeltsin's campaign staff, identified by caption] What happened during the night—or rather, yesterday afternoon, at 1700 [1300 GMT], is this: I was seized on the White House compound, without any explanations, by several people who said they worked for the president's Security Service. Together with them were policemen armed with assault rifles, who were ordered to shoot if I made any attempt to move. I was taken to a room, where I was held between 1700 and 0300 without any explanations: whether I was detained, arrested, or something else.

[Samoletov] What can your detention be connected with?

[Yevstafyev] They asked me a lot of questions about the election. It was, let us say, a very uneven conversation. It is hard for me to tell you about it—you know, the conversation lasted 11 hours without a break, and that leaves a mark on you.

What amazed me was one very interesting utterance I heard. I was told that the president would win in any case, but not thanks to those who have attached themselves to the president—he would win thanks to the real patriots.

[Samoletov] Literally one day ago, General Lebed, the president's new aide on matters of national security, said a certain internal coup was possible.

[Yevstafyev] You know, it is one thing when you watch it on television without experiencing it yourself, but when you feel the full impact on yourself, you start getting the impression that Lebed put it very mildly. [end recording]

Russia: Yeltsin Campaign Aides Listovskiy, Yevstafyev Profiled

LD2006040096 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 0210 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday evening, secret service operatives detained the well-known show-business figure Sergey Lisovskiy and Arkadiy Yestafyev, former deputy managing director of Russian Public Television. [passage omitted]

Both detainees were key figures in Yeltsin's election campaign. Lisovskiy was the main organizer of the "Vote or Lose" program, and Yestafyev was an aide to Anatoliy Chubays, who in turn was one of the leaders of Yeltsin's campaign. [name indistinct] has more details on the detainees:

[Correspondent] Sergey Lisovskiy is one of the biggest players in Russian show business. At the end of the 1980's and beginning of the 1990's, he set up his own firm, Lis, which became one of the most powerful bodies in show business here. Lis organized concerts by some of the most famous pop musicians. Later, Sergey Lisovskiy set up another structure, the Premyer-SV advertising agency, known to most of the public by its television commercials.

Last year, after the murder of Vlad Listyev, it was hinted that Lisovskiy was party to and even organized the crime, since Listyev wanted to change television advertising policy, which was of interest to a major advertising agency. The hints did not pass unnoticed, and Lisovskiy sued the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, and IZVESTIYA newspapers. In fact, the relevant authorities were also interested in Lisovskiy, and he was called into the procurator's office as a witness.

In August last year, Lisovskiy was appointed head of the ORT-Reklama [Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network advertising] body, which dealt with advertising policy on First Channel. After this, the name Lisovskiy appeared rarely in the media for over six months, but with the beginning of the presidential election campaign. Lisovskiy developed and headed an unprecedented campaign, "Vote or Lose." The campaign consisted of concerts by the best-known Russian pop artists in various towns of Russia. During several of these concerts, Boris Yeltsin appeared on stage, and in Rostov-na-Donu he even did the twist. Naturally, a campaign of this kind, especially in the entertainment-starved backwoods, could not fail to bring a large proportion of the youth vote over to Yeltsin. Many observers agree that Yeltsin owes Lisovskiy a respectable number of youth votes.

Unlike Sergey Lisovskiy, Arkadiy Yevstafyev is much less well known. We only know that in his time, he was aide and press secretary to Anatoliy Chubays. Then, he became first deputy managing director of the Russian Public Television Network [ORT] for the information service, and after Chubays's scandalous resignation, he stopped working at ORT and returned to his former boss, again as an aide. Of course, now Chubays was not head of the State Property Committee and was also not a deputy prime minister, but one of the leaders of Boris Yeltsin's election campaign.

So far, no charges have been brought against Lisovskiy or Yevstafyev. [passage omitted]

Russia: Kiselev Reports on Barsukov, Korzhakov Activities

LD2006003196 Moscow NTV in Russian 2335 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Summary] During an unscheduled 12-minute "Segodnya" news bulletin, moderator Yevgeniy Kiselev says that the arrests of two of Yeltsin's campaign managers are part of a long-term plan to disrupt the elections. Between video clips illustrating the contributions to the Yeltsin's campaign by the two arrestees and previous opposition to the elections voiced by Presidential Security Service head Aleksandr Korzhakov, Kiselev says:

"As I was told by senior representatives of the President's election headquarters, Federal Security Service Director Mikhail Barsukov confirmed during a telephone conversation with them that Lisovskiy and Yestafyev have been detained. In the opinion of these representatives of Yeltsin's headquarters, this action by representatives of the power departments is the first step in carrying out a scenario for cancelling the second round of the presidential elections and wrapping it up for democracy in Russia, which was prepared a long time ago."

"It is clear that taking the step to detain the main organiser of the [Vote or Lose] campaign [Lisovskiy] constituted a continuation of actions by the leaders of the power departments attempting to overthrow democracy and cancel the elections. I remind you that General Korzhakov publicly outlined his position for the cancellation of the presidential elections just six weeks ago."

"I remind you that already yesterday, Tuesday, or more precisely the day before yesterday, since in fact it is already Thursday morning now, society became aware of a marked increase in political activity on the part of Aleksandr Korzhakov after the ITAR-TASS news agency informed us of his demarche at a meeting of the Yeltsin election headquarters, where Korzhakov threw himself on Anatoliy Chubays, Georgiy Satarov, Aleksandr Livshits, and Sergey Filatov. Those present say he did not restrain his speech, and informed the key staff of the president's election headquarters directly that—I quote—Russians have mixed feelings about your mugs."

Russia: Yeltsin To Withdraw Bill on 3 Jul Elections From Duma

LD1906172996 Moscow Interfax in English 1638 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin will recall from the State Duma the draft law on declaring July 3, 1996, a day off for the second round of the Russian presidential elections, which was submitted to the Duma by the president on June 17, the presidential press service reported.

Yeltsin has sent a corresponding letter to Russian State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev, the press service said.

Yeltsin decided to recall the bill because the State Duma failed to put it on its agenda as a priority issue. The president considered the Duma's actions as a refusal to guarantee to Russian citizens their constitutional right to rest, the presidential press service said.

The implementation of one constitutional right should not impede the implementation of another constitutional right, Yeltsin said in the letter. In particular, the right to take part in the management and administration of state affairs should not encroach on the right to rest. This may happen if the second round of presidential elections is set for Sunday, a weekend holiday. In this case, Russian citizens would be deprived of the right to have good rest for a second time during a short period of time. Furthermore, Russian citizens will face an alternative that contradicts the essence of the Russian Constitution: they will have to fully realize only one of their two constitutional rights.

Yeltsin said that as the guarantor of human rights and freedoms he would resolve the problem regarding the right to rest within the scope of his presidential powers.

Yeltsin has already instructed the Russian government to consider and resolve in line with existing legislation the issue of declaring July 3, 1996, as a day off, the presidential press service said.

Russia: Yeltsin Criticizes Duma for Refusing To Consider Request

LD1906175296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1702 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin blasted the State Duma for refusing to consider his request to make July 3 a day off to hold the second round of presidential elections and recalled his draft law from the lower house of parliament.

The president described the Duma's stance as a "refusal to provide citizens of Russia with guarantees of their constitutional right to rest."

Yeltsin said that as a guarantor of rights and freedoms, he will ensure citizens' right to rest in full within his powers.

Russia: Chernomyrdin Signs Edict Making 3 Jul 'Non-Working Day'

LD1906164896 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1615 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Jul (Itar-Tass) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin today signed a government edict proclaiming 3 July as a non-working day, an ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned from Viktor Konov, the prime minister's press secretary.

Originally the president had asked the State Duma to urgently consider the question of declaring an extra day off so that the second round of the elections would not hamper the people's recreation. However, the Duma had not begun considering the bill as a priority. That is why the president instructed the government to implement its powers in this sphere.

Russia: Chernomyrdin Sets Presidential Election for 3 Jul

LD1906172196 Moscow Interfax in English 1658 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Interfax) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed a government ordinance under which the second round of presidential elections will be held on July 3, his press secretary Viktor Konnov told Interfax.

Chernomyrdin told communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, the candidate of people's patriotic forces in the presidential elections, with whom he had a 90-minute talk in Moscow Wednesday night, that he had signed the ordinance, Konnov said.

The two men discussed the socioeconomic situation in the country and preparations for the elections, he said.

Zyuganov, he said, agreed that the second round should be held on July 3 and noted that the first round had passed peacefully.

Zyuganov put forward numerous ideas on cooperation or a coalition, Konnov said.

Chernomyrdin responded by saying that he had always believed that cooperation is possible, especially when the gap between the votes cast for the two candidates is that narrow.

Russia: Chernomyrdin, Zyuganov Discuss 2d Round Preparations

LD1906173496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1727 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin met Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov on Wednesday to discuss the social and economic situation in the country and preparations for the second round of presidential elections to be held in the beginning of July, government spokesman Viktor Konnov told Itar-Tass.

Konnov said Chernomyrdin told Zyuganov that he has signed a resolution announcing July 3 a day off. Zyuganov agreed that it would be expedient to hold the runoff on July 3.

The communist leader said the first round went off well and without law breaches.

Chernomyrdin and Zyuganov agreed that the preparations for the second round should be held in a calm atmosphere without excesses.

In response to Zyuganov's call for cooperation, including through a coalition, the prime minister said he has always favoured such an approach which becomes especially topical now that the gap in votes collected by Yeltsin and Zyuganov is so small.

"We must do everything possible to avoid divisions and confrontation in society," he said.

Russia: Official Discusses Election Runoff Dates, Campaigns

LD1906203496 Moscow NTV in Russian 1535 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Summary] Pavel Lapkov moderates a 25-minute live interview with Aleksandr Veshnyakov, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission [TsIK], on the "Hero of the Day" program.

Lapkov begins by saying that the official election results promised by the TsIK today have not yet been announced, and the second round has not been announced yet. "This creates an atmosphere of certain nervousness. TsIK secretary Aleksandr Veshnyakov is in our studio today. Good evening! Could you please tell us when we can expect the end of the first round, I mean, when will we know the results of the first round, when will the protocols be published, and when will canvassing begin?"

Veshnyakov replies: "There is a chance that we will be able to sum up the results tomorrow on the basis of the original protocols from the commission of the constituent parts of the Federation, the summary tables which they provide for us, and the protocols from 400 polling stations set up abroad."

Lapkov asks: "What does it depend on? Who is responsible for the delays?"

Veshnyakov replies: "It is very simple: this is a huge country. About 20-30 protocols from the constituent parts of the Federation are still on their way to us, including from abroad. In principle, we expect to receive almost all of them today and the remaining ones tomorrow morning. There is a small risk that, owing to weather conditions, there may be delays from Tomsk, Sakhalin, and Irkutsk."

Asked about the date for the runoff in the presidential elections and why two dates—30 June and 3 July—are being discussed, Veshnyakov explains: "Under the law, we have 15 days, no more, after the announcement of the official results to fix the date for the runoff. If tomorrow, 20 June, the official results are announced and we add 15 days, the latest date we can have the second round on is 5 July.

"At the same time, under the law, the day of the second round should be a day off, not a working day. Therefore, we have one real date: Sunday, 30 June. There are proposals to make a special day off and to amend legislation accordingly: therefore, 3 July is under discussion."

In a recorded interview, Mark Urnov, an analyst from the presidential team, says: "The date of the runoff will play an absolutely key role because the conditions in which the elections are now taking place, bearing in mind that the gap between Yeltsin and Zyuganov is minimal and is just over 2 million people, turnout will decide everything. It is obvious that Lebed has improved the situation to a certain degree because he will bring some of his voters with him, but one should not regard this as a factor that will change the situation radically. The key factor is turnout. The key factor is the mobilization of Yeltsin's voters. If it is slightly lower than it was in the first round, Yeltsin will have fewer votes than Zyuganov."

Continuing the interview with Veshnyakov, the moderator expresses surprise at the voting results in Chechnya where, according to preliminary results, 51 percent voted for Yeltsin while in the neighboring republics of North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, Zyuganov was in the lead. The OSCE—Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—observers said the Chechen elections were in violation of international democratic norms. Veshnyakov says the commission still has not received the protocols from Chechnya, so he cannot comment.

Asked when new election broadcasts will begin, Veshnyakov replies: "The rules remain the same, except that now there are two players, two candidates. Before the first round, 10 minutes in the morning and 10 minutes in the evening allocated by the state television and radio companies were divided between 11 and then 10 candidates. This time, the time will be divided between two."

Lapkov asks: "Does this mean that every day, 10 minutes in the morning and 10 minutes in the evening on each state television and radio channel will be allocated to Yeltsin and Zyuganov?"

Veshnyakov replies: "Yes, it will be free air time Monday to Friday." Veshnyakov also says there will either be a draw or the candidates can reach an agreement between themselves on how to divide the air time.

In conclusion, Lapkov asks: "Do I understand correctly that canvassing can begin already on the next day after you publish the protocols?"

Veshnyakov replies: "As soon as we announce the results of the 16 June elections and fix the date for the runoff, from that moment canvassing can begin."

Lapkov: "In other words, this can be expected tomorrow?"

Veshnyakov: "Yes, providing we do not have some force majeur circumstances due to weather conditions, which may delay the arrival of the election documents."

Russia: Yeltsin's Second-Round Win Seen Almost Assured

MK1906133196 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by chief editor Vitaliy Tretyakov: "The First Round Made Yeltsin the Leader of the Presidential Race and General Lebed, a Key Political Figure for the Near Future"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] What ensured Yeltsin's victory in the first round? Five main factors did. I will enumerate them in the order of their priority.

First. The unwillingness of the greater part of society — even in the midst of all the hardships of semireform and all the flaws of the incumbent regime — to take even half a step back into the past.

Second. The electronic media, primarily television. Now it is, in effect, an axiom: In Russia, television makes big-time politics.

Third. Support — including financial — from the elites, above all the Moscow elite.

Fourth. The political qualities of and moves by Boris Yeltsin himself, who managed to show himself in top form and to force the elites, and partially the electorate, to rally in support of the president.

Fifth. Successful actions by the team (or rather, by some of the teams, because, as always, Yeltsin played on several fields simultaneously).

It is especially important to note that the effect of the pro-Communist "Red belt" in the European part of Russia was neutralized and even a little suppressed by the effect from the mobilization of the non-Communist electorate in major cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and so forth).

At the same time it needs to be pointed out that of the 107 million registered voters and the approximately 74 million who turned out (assuming the Central Electoral Commission's turnout figure of 69 percent), Yeltsin got not more than 26-29 million. That is to say, first, a minority. Second, if the votes of all the large oppositions — from purely Communist (Zyuganov) to mixed (Lebed and Zhirinovskiy) to purely democratic (Yavlinskiy) — are added up, the disapproval — full or partial — of the incumbent president and his policy is very high.

Of course, this could be ignored as long as you remain in the Kremlin, but this imbalance exists in society just the same.

For some reason the sharp rise in the performance of the third figure, Lebed, has come as a surprise to many, even though in the past two to three weeks it has been a visible trend. Moreover, it is clear that the Kremlin not only was prepared for it but even bet on it. Recently many forces in effect affiliated with the party of power have been working for Lebed. As a result, Lebed has become the number one figure in Russian politics, at least for the next few weeks: until the second round. Yeltsin can be guaranteed victory in the second round only if Lebed joins his, Yeltsin's, team, or rather his Government or staff. The Kremlin is naturally ready for that. So is Lebed, which is no less natural.

Yavlinskiy has been pushed to fourth place: Some of his electorate, under the force of circumstances and official propaganda, had to vote for Yeltsin, boosting the president's performance. Some had apparently to vote for Lebed. Zhirinovskiy is increasingly moving to the fringe of the political field, which, incidentally, confirms the absurdity of the forecast — once popular among the radical democrats — that the Zyuganov-Zhirinovskiy pair will make it into the second round.

The problem now is to regroup forces. The president is faced with the dilemma: Whether to confine himself to an alliance with Lebed, sacrificing Yavlinskiy to those who have until recently contended that to sink Grigoriy Alekseyevich [Yavlinskiy] is only beneficial for the president; or to invite Yavlinskiy into the coalition.

To be sure, there will be a lot of those wishing to send the Yabloko leader packing for three reasons: 1) He has made a mess of everything (this still needs to be proved); 2) he wants too much (he should be shown his place); and 3) his voters will be ours in the second round just the same (why should we bother with Yavlinskiy himself?). This might be correct from the pragmatic point of view — for the immediate future. But what about a more distant term? True, it should not be forgotten that not only Yeltsin himself or his inner circle can say their word, but also Lebed, whose swan song ['lebed' means 'swan'] will now take on an independent — moreover, far from the least — political tenor in the choir of the Russian power establishment.

Incidentally, it should also be borne in mind that with the wide-ranging and purposeful activity by the elites and the party of power against Yavlinskiy, his showing has not at all been so bad as could have been expected.

Yet another name should be mentioned: Luzhkov. With his fantastic performance, the Moscow mayor has opened the way directly to the very top of Russia's political establishment. In effect, the post of premier is already showing through his pocket. It is easy to see what he has done for Yeltsin in Moscow: It is enough to imagine what would have happened in the capital if the mayor was, for instance, Sobchak. Yet Luzhkov's overstrong positions generate an extremely strong resistance to his upward movement.

This is concerning the question of what will happened in the next few days. As is known, victory corrupts: Infighting is likely to revive within the victorious team, not very friendly as it is. This infighting will very probably turn nasty. This will occur, if not in between the two rounds, when Lebed will perhaps have gotten one of the post designated for him (for instance, secretary of the Security Council), then a little later: after the second round.

The question of all questions, or rather two questions are: 1) Will the elite manage to maintain a more or less decent-looking consolidation without stooping to the primitive vendetta in their ranks? and 2) Will there be a policy revision, taking into consideration the actual voting results: that is, not only those in favor but also those against?

We will soon see this — by the first personnel changes and reactions to them in the upper reaches of power.

We are in for extraordinary times. For the past five years Russia has been constantly fighting with somebody within itself, living in expectation of next crucial election. This has become a life-style, and the meaning of life to many. Now political stability is knocking on the door, but the architects of macro- and microrevolutions are not accustomed to this.

Russia: Second Round Victor Must Seek Compromise With Loser

MM2006103696 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 20 Jun 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vladimir Solovyev under the "Election-96" rubric: "Second Stage"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] The results of the first round of the election have shown not only the extent of the split in society, which is graphically illustrated by the virtually identical number of votes cast for two ideologically irreconcilable candidates. Strange though it may seem, they have also demonstrated the very high degree of society's dissatisfaction with the policies being pursued by the present president.

Let us reflect. Only just over 70 percent of the more than 106 million voters actually voted. Only 35 percent of those who took part said an unconditional "yes" to B. Yeltsin's course. All the rest (let us leave the question of their reasons out of the equation for the present) in one way or another denied the present power their trust. Here is a problem for primary school children to solve: How many people in the country refused to support Yeltsin, and how many did support him? But let us be objective — the results of the "school" problem apply equally to G. Zyuganov's bloc (the results were practically identical!).

There is just one answer to the question "What lies behind this?" It is the aforementioned split in society. This situation is highly dangerous and fraught with far-reaching consequences. But I will be so bold as to maintain that they are by no means the consequences with which many of the power's propagandists are now intimidating us — you are on the threshold of civil war, they say. They scare people with stories claiming that the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] has detachments of gunmen, etc.

All this — forgive the harsh words — is utter crap, or, as one of the classic writers said, "the ravings of a rabid bourgeois" (I would also add "of an extremely ignorant" one). It is sufficient to take a calm and intelligent look at the real facts.

There is no 50-50 standoff in society along ideological lines. The votes were spread too thinly. Not one of the forces has the support of the absolute majority of the population. At the same time this absolute majority favors a serious change in the course of the reforms in the country but is not opposed to their implementation.

It is important to be aware of this. Very many sharp journalists who today level charges of antireformism at the CPRF bloc bring to mind the old saying about fools who cannot be made to pray because they will be sure to smash their forehead. For the lion's share of Zyuganov's election platform is devoted to the question of continuing the reforms.

I would very much like our readers to "divide by 25" the loud phrases about the "military-combat" threat from the left. All this is a vast "nothing" aimed only at intimidating people and making fools of them. Nothing more lies behind this.

It is my personal view that the real threat lies elsewhere. Over the coming weeks voters will find themselves being pulled toward the two main flanks. But one thing is obvious even now — however this is done, neither side will be able to win with an overwhelming advantage. Victory will be ensured literally by a scant superiority.

But what will happen to all of us if the winner suddenly announces that he has been elected by the whole people and, thus, has gotten full carte blanche for any actions? For in our conditions Zyuganov risks coming up against serious resistance from those who cast their votes for Yeltsin. Yeltsin in turn, in disregarding the opinion of exactly such a part of the population as was "his [Zyuganov's] electorate," risks eliciting sharp condemnation from the voters who have been ignored. It seems to me that it is precisely this that is the chief danger, a danger from which there is just one way out — to ensure that the newly elected president is able to become the president of "all Russians" not in words, as used to be the case, but in reality. This means just one thing — a demonstration of readiness to compromise, when Yeltsin will take the demands of Zyuganov's voters into account and, conversely, Zyuganov will manage to find a common language with those who follow Yeltsin. There is no other way, for there is only one alternative — confrontation. But has not Mother Russia become sated with this over the past century?

The results of the first round have shown another serious problem, one whose underestimation could lead to serious mistakes on the part of the future power. It has come to light that directly opposite views on the candidates are held, on the whole, in the national republics and the industrial centers, the city and the countryside, the capital cities and the provinces. All this certainly does not attest to a simple distribution of purely human sympathies. This is an accurate indicator of the most acute problems that exist today. Namely, the authorities are denied trust by agrarians, who are fed up with agricultural questions being disregarded and with the majority of the peasantry's interests being ignored. The national formations which disagree with the present nationalities policy vote against the present president. [passage omitted]

Russia: Government Paper Backs Deal With Zyuganov

MM1906150196 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Ivanitskiy: "Thirteen Concerned Men Advocate a Compromise Between Yeltsin and Zyuganov in the Interests of Russia's Progress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] And so the first round is over. Yeltsin's improbable surge, which the Communists refused to accept until the last moment, has become for them an awful reality. And in light of the president's coalition prospects, his victory in the second round is more than likely. The result also exposed his rival's main weakness: The CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] electorate proved to be like an army that, though magnificently mobilized, found itself a very long way from home. Zyuganov succeeded in winning neither allies nor fellow travelers.

This is all the more surprising in that virtually the majority of people in Russia were, to put it mildly, dissatisfied with the authorities. But in the final analysis, this majority proved to be separated from the electoral "Red Belt" by an impenetrable wall.

Shortly before the election there appeared in print yet another open letter from well-known entrepreneurs — the authors of the so-called "Appeal of the 13." This time there was only one addressee: Gennadiy Zyuganov.

The appeal concerned the CPRF leader's economic program, which had already been utterly torn to pieces by all economists and the noncommunist press. The major sensation in the letter, however, proved to be...the absence of sensations: The financiers seemed to be repeating what everyone knew already. That the program of the "people's patriots" is no program at all but a compilation of government projects (already being carried out), Brezhnevite Gosplan instructions, and noneconomic phraseology. That the "parity of prices" suggested by the Communists would undermine the basis of the contemporary Russian economy — the fuel and energy complex — and deprive the country of hard currency and investments. That isolation from the world markets would write off any hope of technological modernization, once and for all consigning the country to the "Third World." That the "vigorous regulation" of the money supply and prices would once again turn money into just so much paper and the store shelves into a wilderness. And that in the upshot anything that remains in the way of efficient industry would come under the control of multinational corporations, and the Communists would finally bury the country's economic independence to which they daily and loudly avow their loyalty. In short, everything in the program is terrible, bar the parts that are plagiarized. And its only "plus" is that it is completely unrealizable.

Bankers are people with sufficient grounding in economics to understand that Zyuganov's program is "beyond repair," and that there is nothing to discuss, particularly in public. And they are too busy to engage in trying to eradicate the economic illiteracy of the "popular patriotic" doctors of philosophy. From this it follows that the businessmen's step was a purely political move. The principle addressee of the letter also becomes clear. Of course, it is not Zyuganov, and not even Yeltsin — but society, that is to say, the voters. The leaders of the major banks and design bureaus, of concerns and oil companies, let it be known that they no longer stand "above the fray."

In calling on the authorities and the CPRF to reach a compromise six weeks before the elections the commanders of the economy became not simply a real "third force," but also arbiters. The authorities and the CPRF accepted this status of the 13, beginning a covert competition for their favor. By appealing to Zyuganov, the financiers disavowed their appeal for compromise, but not the position of judge. Quite simply, the judge publicly, before an audience of 100 million, delivered the verdict that the CPRF program does not lead to compromise.

It was possibly this verdict that at the decisive moment caused the silent, albeit dissatisfied, majority to spurn Zyuganov. Their timely word helped to activate the instinct of self-preservation in those who had such an instinct. This is what the television monitor at No. 2 Tsvetnoy Boulevard [Parliamentary Center] highlighted.

The monitor highlighted something else as well, however. A little over 20 million votes for Zyuganov. And here, plus or minus 1 percent has no significance. Therefore, despite the impossibility of compromising with Zyuganov's program, a compromise with Zyuganov himself is both possible and necessary. First, Zyuganov, to all appearances, cannot fail to understand what his program cost him. At any rate, he must have had a better understanding of this Monday morning. Second, it is in society's interests for the aforementioned 20 million people to remain under the control of the peaceable and, generally speaking, predictable Zyuganov, rather than of someone else. A signal from that quarter of readiness to compromise on the basis of a coalition cabinet appeared almost as soon as the initial results had been made public. Vladimir Semago, the main businessman from the CPRF, stated that, first, the competition between Yeltsin and Zyuganov today is not the competition of programs but of individuals; and second, for Gennadiy Zyuganov personal ambitions have "always been secondary." Translated from political-speak this means: Zyuganov is ready for consultations with the authorities; he won't just get out his economic program at these consultations — in view of the results of the first round, he agrees to participate in the formation of a cabinet "in Yeltsin's image," and not "without Yeltsin." The majority of businessmen from the so-called "Red Belt" are also for compromise under these circumstances. The author of this article was informed of this by one of the biggest entrepreneurs in the sphere of pharmacology, who runs a joint-stock company in Ryazan, who wished, however, to speak anonymously.

Much suggests that the "13 concerned men" have again been proved right, and once again at the right time.

Russia: Account of Lebed's 18 Jun Press Conference Given

MM1906181296 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Pelts: "News Conference Held by Aleksandr Lebed, Secretary of the Security Council and the Russian Federation President's Aide on National Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 18 June Aleksandr Lebed, newly appointed secretary of the Security Council and presidential national security aide, held his first news conference for the Russian and foreign mass media. It must be said that it generated great interest.

Before answering the journalists' questions, Aleksandr Lebed made a short statement. He recalled that, if he lost in the first round of the presidential election, he had promised his voters to "determine his stance." That was why he considered his present step to be the practical implementation of his preelection program.

Aleksandr Lebed went on to emphasize that "a real danger of social and political confrontation, capable of growing into armed conflict, continues to exist in the country" now. That was why he saw it as his main task in his new post to "restrain all sides from the desire to use force." Apart from that, in his opinion, it was necessary to create real mechanisms to control military power. The people of Russia should not have to suffer as a result of politicians' quarrels, they should not have to experience the results of another "inhuman experiment." "I am a soldier, I have had my fill of fighting; professionally I hate war, and I will do everything to ensure that there is no war on Russian soil!" Thus Aleksandr Lebed concluded his short statement.

The answers given by the new Security Council secretary to the numerous questions from journalists can be divided into three basic groups. The first consists of strictly political questions. For example, journalists asked the former candidate for the highest state post to explain in more detail his decision to accept a new and very responsible post. Would his decision not affect the voters who voted for him?

Commenting on his decision, Aleksandr Lebed noted that the voters voted for him first and foremost because they believed in his program. "I am fed up with chatterboxes," he stressed," who have made a profession of being in opposition." Aleksandr Lebed agreed that not everyone who voted him would give their votes to Boris Yeltsin in the second round. "One-fifth will be shaken," he noted. "The others will understand." Aleksandr Lebed stressed that ultimately he had chosen "a new idea, which is being implemented badly at the moment." But, from what he said, it is still better than the old one.

During the news conference Aleksandr Lebed was asked whether he intended to campaign for Boris Yeltsin ahead of the second round of the presidential election. In response, the new Security Council secretary said that he was "not much of an organizer of mass entertainment," and that he would be spending all the period in question working in the Security Council. "The president has supported my plans," he asserted.

Aleksandr Lebed then stressed that he had been given extended powers to implement his program, which he intended to use in reorganizing the Security Council. In his opinion, the country was facing a big threat not from external factors but from very complex economic, social, and environmental problems. Furthermore, questions of regional policy, which have recently been exacerbated, presented a serious danger for Russia. Pursuing this theme, the Security Council secretary also touched on the problem of the Chechnya crisis. "I have already expounded my views on this conflict in the election program," Aleksandr Lebed stressed. "Chechnya is a thorn in Russia's flesh. We can and must resolve the problem." It was then noted that Oleg Lobov was to stay in the post of the president's authorized representative in Chechnya until the new Security Council secretary had gotten into the swing of his job and "sets up his own combat formation." Speaking about the talks between the representatives of the federal center and the Chechen separatists, Aleksandr Lebed stated that "the people who began them will be the people who continue them."

The second block of questions concerned Aleksandr Lebed's immediate plans in his new post. First and foremost, as was said, he intended to get seriously involved in the reorganization of the entire apparatus and the actual structure of the Security Council. The need for such reorganization ensued from the expansion of the Security Council's powers and functions. The situation in the country was such that the council had to be involved not just in global problems of national security, but also in more specific "domestic" affairs. This must include first and foremost a constant, objective assessment of the situation in the country, a profound analysis of the processes which could destabilize it, and an elaboration of specific measures to neutralize them, Aleksandr Lebed stated.

The reorganization of the Security Council apparatus was to be conducted in various spheres. One of the main tasks was to create a single information-analysis center. Aleksandr Lebed intended to communicate his proposals on this and other questions of the Security

Council reorganization at its next sitting. After the news conference had ended, Aleksandr Lebed stated to an ITAR-TASS correspondent: "I will start by removing all of its staff." This will be "a kind of shock therapy," the Security Council secretary emphasized.

And finally, the third group of questions: the fight against crime and the reform of the Army. Noting that crime exists in all countries, even the most civilized, Aleksandr Lebed nevertheless noted that in our country the situation is actually rather more complicated. In Russia practically all spheres of public life are in the grip of criminal elements. He saw his task as moving the crime problem from the political sphere onto a juridical level. At the same time, Aleksandr Lebed emphasized the fact that the Russian legal base was inadequate for effectively combating crime. This situation must be changed by the will of the president.

"We will fight against crime, and we will fight in a civilized way," Aleksandr Lebed emphasized. He made it clear that the law-enforcement organs do not have the necessary technical equipment to do this at the moment. And they are fighting against well-equipped and well-organized groups of bandits, who are even supplied with state-of-the-art bugging devices.

Aleksandr Lebed said little about reform in the Army. But he stressed that he had specific plans, not yet ratified by the president. For the time being he intended to study the situation and get a picture of what has been done in recent years. Commenting on the dismissal of Army General Pavel Grachev, the Security Council secretary said that "the step in question is necessary and ensues from the prevailing situation."

Touching on the problem of the expansion of NATO to the east, Aleksandr Lebed noted that his stance was perfectly clear: "We are no longer fighting against anyone, and we have enough strength not to have to reshape the political map of the world." At the same time, he added, "we will find ways of bringing it to the notice of the taxpayers that the creation of a military infrastructure on the territory of the Baltic countries will cost them approximately $100 billion." Another $150 billion would be spent on the modification of weapons. "So, if they have the money and thevigor, let them expand," he added.

Russia: Zyuganov To Offer Lebed 'Good Position' If Elected

LD1906142096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1333 GMT 19 Jun 96

[By Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Itar-Tass) — Newly appointed Russian Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed today had a meeting with Gennadiy Zyuganov, the Number 2 presidential candidate.

Zyuganov told a news conference today that he had discussed with Lebed "all questions related to national security of the country" from the economic, territorial and personal perspectives. Zyuganov has reaffirmed that he is to meet Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin at a date which will be disclosed soon. Zyuganov said he and Lebed agreed that "security is at the lowest mark", dictating vigorous measures for fighting crime and corruption. He said he would consent to place Lebed on the popular trust government if he won the second round of the presidential election as security is of equal importance for the right and left.

"A good position will be offered to Aleksandr Lebed, he may be calm," Zyuganov said. He voiced confidence that Lebed's electorate would vote for him. "We are counting on two-thirds of Lebed's electorate," Zyuganov said.

He has reaffirmed his plan to meet all drop-out candidates who had got less than one per cent of the vote in the first round, including Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR).

The parliamentary LDPR faction has "sensible people", also eligible for posts in the popular trust government, Zyuganov said.

He said the membership of the government was discussed at the Wednesday meeting of the board of the "popular patriotic bloc".

The list of would-be government members might be published early in the next week, Zyuganov said.

"We are speaking not about the building of communism but about the creation of a nationally oriented state, not about a communist government but about the government of popular trust," Zyuganov explained. He has repeatedly challenged Boris Yeltsin to meet with him in a live televised debate or to speak together with him at a joint meeting of the lower and upper parliament houses.

Asked about chances of Boris Yeltsin to be placed on the Zyuganov-formed government, he said, "We are ready to cooperate with all, no one will be able to cope with problems alone, and the government still has to be coalition."

Zyuganov said he was calm about July 3 as the possible date for the second round of the election.

Russia: Lebed Says 'Any Mutiny Will Be Quashed'

LD2006031096 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 0230 GMT 20 Jun 96

[Interview with National Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed by two unidentified correspondents near his car outside government offices in central Moscow on 20 June; from the "Teleutro" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Aleksandr Ivanovich [Lebed], what is happening? Good evening, or rather, good morning.

[Lebed] Probably the only thing we have achieved in five years is that this election has taken place, and now, attempts are being made to wreck the second round. That is my first impression. I still must sort it out in detail. I shall not allow... [changes thought] Any mutiny will be quashed, and quashed with extreme severity. Those who want to throw the country into the abyss of bloody chaos deserve no mercy at all.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Ivanovich, all the news reports tonight feature two possibly key figures—Mikhail Barsukov and Aleksandr Korzhakov.

[Lebed] So what? I shall name all the names after I have sorted everything out.

[Correspondent] So we cannot say anything for certain right now?

[Lebed] We cannot.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Ivanovich, can we go with you?

[Lebed] Where to?

[Correspondent] Well, to look at how you are going to restore order, for the country to see.

[Lebed] There is no need. All this is superfluous. I hate it when someone is trailing me.

[Correspondent] Suppose something happens to you.

[Lebed] Nothing will happen to me. There is a spell on me.

[Correspondent] When can we expect more news from you?

[Lebed] After I have sorted it out, I will invite you and provide you with information.

[Correspondent] But people are worried. Maybe this afternoon?

[Lebed] Yes, I think so. This afternoon.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Ivanovich, the last question now: Were you to some extent prepared for this? After all, your statement to the effect that some kind of internal political plot is possible was made literally 24 hours before today's developments.

[Lebed] It was in the air.

[Correspondent] So it was not a surprise for you?

[Lebed] No, it was not.

[Correspondent] Well, good luck to you then. Thank you.

[Lebed] Thank you. [video shows Lebed getting into his car, car being driven through the gate of government offices]

Russia: Coup Claim Seen Damaging Lebed's 'Prestige'

MM1906154096 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 96 pp 1, 2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Combat Alert Declared by General Lebed Proves To Be 'Mock Alert'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksandr Lebed's statement at his first-ever press conference in his capacity as Security Council secretary and the Russian president's assistant for national security that "he had already resolved one specific matter — he had prevented an attempt by circles close to the military minister to stage 'SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] No. 3'" — came as a bombshell.

During the morning and afternoon of 19 June I made the rounds of the quarters indicated by A. Lebed in his sensational statement. The information I obtained becomes more intelligible when compared with what the new Security Council secretary said.

According to the general, these circles were intending to mobilize troops from Moscow Military District and the airborne forces. However, Lebed said, I have managed to secure the troops' total loyalty. "I know for certain," he emphasized, "that there will be no trouble."

But the alarm over the "SCSE" intensified still further after the new Security Council secretary's appearance on the NTV program "Hero of the Day." Aleksandr Lebed said that between 0900 and 1000 hours on 18

June in the restroom of the defense minister's office Generals Barynkin, Shulikov, Sitnov, Kharchenko, and Lapshov, Yelena Agapova, the defense minister's press secretary, and also Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze "tried to persuade the defense minister to put troops on alert and thereby pressure the president." After noting that "he does not know of plans for further actions on the part of the persons in question," Aleksandr Lebed disclosed that he had "taken his own measures" — "I gave orders to the duty general at the General Staff Central Command Post and forbade him to pass on any directives from the defense minister to the troops."

Then, Lebed said, he went to the Moscow Military District headquarters. A telegram was sent from there over his signature in which he "notified troops of the replacement of Pavel Grachev" and asked them to "remain calm and continue with routine combat and operational training." Lebed, according to his account, also visited the headquarters of the Airborne Forces, and the commander of the Airborne Forces told him that he had "only one supreme commander in chief."

We have managed to establish that the 18 June meeting in the defense minister's restroom did indeed take place. And not only with the people mentioned by General Lebed. Admittedly, according to our information, Colonel General Dmitriy Kharchenko was not among them that morning — at that time he was meeting with Russian Government Vice Premier Aleksey Bolshakov. But, so I have been told by certain parties to the event, there was no talk of any opposition to the president over the removal of Grachev.

"You've known me a long time," one colonel general told me (for ethical reasons we cannot give his name or those of my other interlocutors — V.L.), "do I look like a madman?"

Another general said that anyhow there was no reason to discuss "some kind of sedition." The defense minister and the Russian president had a discussion in the Kremlin the previous day, on the evening of 17 June. Boris Yeltsin asked Pavel Grachev to continue as defense minister. But after Grachev had refused and had himself handed in his resignation, it would have been ridiculous and stupid to "pressure" the president. "Serious statesmen adopt this or that decision, and it is unworthy of a general's honor to interfere in their work in any way."

"We simply assembled at the defense minister's in order to say farewell to Pavel Sergeyevich as men and comrades," another participant in these events told me. "I will make no secret of the fact that we raised a glass or two. That is perfectly normal. For good or ill, we were in the same team for four years. It would have been inhuman not to give him a sendoff."

So far as we know, not only the people listed by Aleksandr Lebed on TV but also all the deputy defense ministers and also all the commanders of the armed services came along to say farewell to Defense Minister Grachev. Virtually the entire Defense Ministry collegium. They assert that there was no talk of any "SCSE" here either. It remains a mystery to this circle of people just who recounted their conversations to the new Security Council secretary and in what form, and why precisely with this emphasis rather than some other. This affair will do nothing to increase Aleksandr Lebed's prestige, they say.

"It is as much of a mystery," I was told, "as the question of who a month ago told Defense Minister Grachev what Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his agent Colonel General Boris Gromov had said in a one-on-one meeting in a Kremlin office ahead of the first round of the elections. Who feels the need to kindle scandals among the top commanders of the Armed Forces and why? Do these people think all this benefits our president?!"

The fact that Aleksandr Lebed visited the headquarters of the Airborne Troops and Moscow Military District was also confirmed in conversation with your IZVESTIYA correspondent. I was told by high-ranking officers of these military departments that the general was told that "no one there has received any orders regarding opposition to the president's edicts or has passed on any such directives to anyone. They are not going to pass anything on. The troops under their command are under control, are going about their normal business, and remain absolutely loyal to the Russian president and supreme commander in chief. There is no need to try to secure their loyalty. There are no doubts about it."

Nevertheless, Aleksandr Lebed did send a coded telegram to the troops regarding his appointment as Security Council secretary and the president's assistant for national security. It was intended for all deputy defense ministers, commanders of armed services, commanders of military districts and armies, and commanders of large strategic formations, institutions, and separate units. The first paragraph of the telegram, according to the TV program, demands that troops "engage in routine combat and operational training," and the second is addressed directly to generals.

"Messrs. Generals," it says, "don't spend treasury money on telegrams of commiseration, or I will call you to account."

This coded telegram also caused a commotion among the troops. On the evening of 18 June, we were told, the main staffs of armed services and General Staff main directorates received a lot of calls on secure communication lines asking them to explain what was meant and how these instructions should be taken.

"I said to take everything calmly and not get in a stew," one commander told me.

According to ITAR-TASS, on the evening of 18 June Lieutenant General Andrey Ivanov, spokesman for the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, told journalists at the Russian president's situation room: In connection with the personnel reshuffle "there can be no question of any moods among the military, who have always obeyed and are continuing to obey orders."

"The resignation of Pavel Grachev is Russia's internal affair, and I have no intention of commenting on President Boris Yeltsin's decision," Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze stated at Tbilisi airport on his arrival from Moscow, according to ITAR-TASS. According to our information, he flew to the Russian capital to sign with Defense Minister Grachev a document on the transfer to the Russian Army of the combat equipment that is supposed to go to Russia under the terms of the new Vienna agreement. But so far it has not been possible to do this.

At the appointed time for the signing of the documents Grachev was summoned to see the president. And after that meeting his signature was invalid.

On 19 June the State Duma instructed its Defense and Security Committees to give deputies an official explanation about Lebed's statement about a conspiracy. This was done at the proposal of Deputy Sergey Baburin at a plenary session. Baburin insisted that the committees report whether there were serious grounds for fears over state security or no conspiracy actually existed.

Meanwhile Viktor Ilyukhin, head of the Security Committee (CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] faction), stated that "neither the government nor the special services have information about a conspiracy, and there were no attempts in this sphere." According to V. Ilyukhin, after P. Grachev's resignation "his comrades assembled at the Defense Ministry and there was a certain amount of talk, but there was no question of a conspiracy." Ilyukhin voiced the opinion that in view of General Lebed's appointment as Security Council secretary "Russia will experience constant mock alerts."

According to our information, the "members of the SCSE" named on TV by Lebed are continuing to go about their proper business. For instance, on the morning of 19 June Colonel General Viktor Barynkin, chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate, held a routine map training session with his subordinates. Let us hasten to reassure you — the maps did not show operational plans for seizing Moscow and the Kremlin.

Russia: Crimea's Final Voting Results Places Zyuganov Third

LD1906125396 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1140 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol [no date as received] — According to the final voting results in the first round of the Russian presidential election in Crimean constituencies, Boris Yeltsin leads with 40.5 percent, followed by Aleksandr Lebed with 19.9 percent, and Gennadiy Zyuganov in third place, with 19.1 percent of the vote. Ukrainian left-wing movements earlier predicted Zyuganov's victory in Crimea.

Most Crimean voters were Black Sea Fleet servicemen.

Russia: Gap Between Poll Findings, Actual Voting Figures Examined

MM2006102296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Andrey Vasilyev, Lidya Dergacheva, and Maksim Krans of the IZVESTIYA Analysis Center: "The Magic of Numbers Again Played a Cruel Joke on Voters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Lebed's sensational breakthrough was a total surprise not only to the other contenders for the presidency but also to the sociologists. The other votes, too, were distributed somewhat differently to what the leading sociological services had predicted. This is evidenced by comparing data from the last preelection predictions with Central Electoral Commission [TsIK] information obtained after 99 percent of the ballot papers had been counted.

The centers' deviations from the preliminary voting results are reflected in the diagram.

OK, mistakes are made in predictions. The classic example was the 1970 election in Britain, when the results of all polls and analytical forecasts were predicting a win for the Labor Party whereas in fact the Conservatives won, and by a considerable margin. But that was more of an exception to the rule, which caused quite a lot of fuss in scientific circles. In recent years Western sociologists have had every reason to be proud of the accuracy of their predictions. Thus the divergence between the famous Gallup service's predictions and the actual results comes to no more than 1-2 percent.

Our sociological services, however, report a possible statistical error rate of 3-4 percent. You get the feeling that each sociological service gauges the mood among some personal "electorate" of its own. Many sociologists recorded the growth in the number of potential Yeltsin supporters: Watching him drawing level with his main rival and then passing him and sprinting away.... Analyzing the population's sympathies, the Expert Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Moscow Carnegie Institute predicted a convincing win for Zyuganov. Whereas the Institute for the Sociology of Parliamentarianism, having promised Yeltsin a record 40 percent of the vote in the first third of June, "took back" more than 7 percent from him a few days later. The one which turned out closest to the truth was the "Public Opinion" foundation, but it too overlooked General Lebed.

There is a serious explanation for all this: As in any unstable "borderline" society we lack a stable public opinion — rather we have a public mood. And it, like an adolescent during puberty, constantly varies and changes according to what is going on. Plus there is also a difference between what people say and how they actually act.

The disparity what is proclaimed and what is accomplished is known in science as "Lapierre's Paradox," and it is always allowed for in predictions, including political predictions. The fineness of this adjustment depends on how long the observations are made for, but whereas in Western countries they are conducted and compared over many decades, in our country the tally as yet is only measured in years.

A legitimate question arising from this is: Can the social technology that "works" in a stable society be applied as effectively in Russia? It is extremely dubious, as is testified by the divergences between the predictions and results in all recent elections.

In any case, the magic of devious numbers has played a cruel joke: Many Yeltsin supporters decided that the current president already had victory in his pocket, as he himself repeatedly stated, and so they could afford not to bother turning out to vote. Unfortunately his phrase that "we must not be complacent, we must not hope that everything will turn our OK of its own accord," came too late.

Russia: Economist Compares Yeltsin, Zyuganov Program

MM2006140296 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI (Political Wednesday section) in Russian 19 Jun 96 p II

[Interview with economist Mikhail Delyagin by Lyudmila Nikolayeva; place and date not given: "The Choice Between Yeltsin and Zyuganov Is a Choice Between Stability and Catastrophe, Mikhail Delyagin, the Well-Known Russian Economist, Believes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Nikolayeva] In your opinion, what are Russia's prospects after the election? Are there objective factors which will surface no matter how events develop?

[Delyagin] The customary view is that a victory for the "right" candidate will automatically lead to the solution of all problems. However, no matter how events develop today it may be confidently predicted that the economic situation will worsen between late August and early October.

[Nikolayeva] Do you think that this is the price of electoral populism?

[Delyagin] Good heavens, where have you seen that? What is happening now is not an increase in injections of cash into the economy but a change in the way they are structured. Money that was previously used to support knowingly inefficient ways of organizing people is now being paid out to them directly — and thank God for that. This is one reason for the restoration of the population's real incomes (which rose by 12.5 percent February-April) and the end of the slump in production (in April the production volume rose by 0.4 percent) and the simultaneous suppression of inflation (4.1 percent in January, 2.8 percent in February and March, 2.2 percent in April, and in May the prediction was 1.8 percent but the figure proved to be 1.5 percent).

Election promises are being carried out without an unplanned increase in money supply so this is not inflationary in character and is not having a destructive effect on the economy.

[Nikolayeva] So what is the problem?

[Delyagin] First it is due to seasonal factors. The sun rises in the east, spring begins in March, summer in June, and economic conditions begin to worsen one way or another in the second half of August. This is still an immutable law of nature for our national economy.

The second factor is a shortage of finance. Because of an unduly harsh financial policy the state has been unable to meet all its commitments for quite a long time now.

In the first quarter federal budget expenditure alone was 25 percent below plan. Of course this cannot go on indefinitely.

Lastly, the most important factor. All Russia's major companies and banks want stability and predictability. "Bad stability is better than good chaos" — those aren't my words, the phrase was coined by business people. They have an interest in Yeltsin's staying on, which is why they are aiding the state's efforts to curb inflation.

However, this obliging attitude will not last forever. After the elections Russia's biggest companies — and these are whole sectors — will remind the state of their needs, the financial situation that has been rapidly deteriorating for a year now, the depletion of investment resources, and the interest in higher prices.

[Nikolayeva] What is the state going to do? Will it be able to resist the interests of key components of the economy?

[Delyagin] The state is the resultant force of the components of society and above all the components of the economy. It can balance out the differences in their interests but when all the interests coincide the state simply cannot resist them for long.

The state's actions in the specific situation that exists at the start of fall will depend on the shape it is in at that time and the conditions obtaining after the election.

If Yeltsin wins there will be an increasing influx of capital — foreign, and the Russian capital which fled in the past six-eight months — back into Russia. This influx will partly offset the deterioration in economic conditions and make it possible to keep within the framework of a rational economic policy.

Inflation will be kept under control by banning centralized credit to fund the budget deficit, the agreement with the IMF, which increases confidence in Russia and the flow of resources into it, will be fulfilled, and the shortage of resources for stimulating development and so forth will be offset by using bills of exchange and bills backed by state guarantees: Defense Ministry spending and shipments to the north are being funded by that method now.

In 1997 the rationalization of Russia's tax system will begin: It will be streamlined and stabilized (the tax regime will change once a year, not every couple of days), the tax burden will be reduced through a more equal distribution of taxation, and taxpayers' rights will be protected for the first time.

The system of monitoring the expenditure of budget resources which was created during the repayment of the federal budget debt to the population will probably be strengthened and extended to all types of state expenditure.

These changes will be a real revolution in the sphere of state finances. They will make it possible to lay the foundation for achieving stable economic growth in the years ahead.

[Nikolayeva] But the growth that Yeltsin plans to achieve in the year 2000 is being promised by Zyuganov before this year is out.

[Delyagin] He would be equally justified in promising his voters heavenly houris, a land of milk and honey, and the building of Communism "before this year is out." "To each according to his need" — do you remember that?

Anyone, even if he does not think about the economy, but simply lives in Russia, will understand that a 5-6 percent average growth of GDP in 1996-1997 is very far outside the bounds of reality. Chubays was being extremely optimistic when he talked about a token 1 percent growth in 1996. At best there will probably be a 2-3 percent reduction.

[Nikolayeva] At best — does that mean if Yeltsin wins?

[Delyagin] If Yeltsin wins and if the most rational policy is implemented.

But if Zyuganov wins it will be far worse. Money will not flow into Russia, simply because investors are afraid of him and his party. Consequently the worsening of economic conditions in late summer-early fall will not be offset but will simply be aggravated. There will be no money, they will have to print it and the country will be plunged into the chaos of hyperinflation.

Incidentally, Zyuganov's program clearly envisages that budget expenditure will be funded by Central Bank credits. This will eliminate the main achievement of the reforms — control of inflation. Russian capital, which has only just clambered onto the firm shore of the real economy, will be swept by this measure back into the quagmire of purely speculative operations. Then the only force capable of financing investment projects will be the transnational companies which will soon control all the competitive sectors of the Russian economy.

[Nikolayeva] Wait a moment — Zyuganov calls himself a patriot....

[Delyagin] He can call himself a Slavophile if he likes. The result of his program will still be to trigger inflation and for purely objective reasons this will mean the weakening of domestic capital and Russia's loss of real sovereignty.

But slogans are no obstacle, all this can be implemented to the accompaniment of even the most jingoistic slogans.

[Nikolayeva] But since you have started on this subject, tell me what, in your opinion, is the basic difference between the main contenders' programs?

[Delyagin] The main difference between the Yeltsin and Zyuganov programs is in their direction: Whereas the former wants to continue moving forward to stable economic growth and prosperity on the basis of what has been achieved, the latter's program is oriented toward returning to the "bright past" and continuing the policy which has already brought our motherland to national disaster once before.

I do not want to idealize either the present-day situation or Yeltsin's program. However, we are choosing not between heaven and hell but between hell and hard work which will not yield results right away. If Zyuganov wins, however, all work will be pointless, as it was in the USSR.

[Nikolayeva] Is that not too harsh? After all, Zyuganov has quite a respectable program, there is a lot of sense in it....

[Delyagin] There are many wise words and good intentions there. I would unhesitatingly subscribe to many of them. But I cannot say the same for the main point — the mechanism for implementing the transformations, which is outlined in great detail and very candidly in the program.

It is simple: the restoration of the distorted pre-reform price structure (in which fuel and raw materials are much cheaper and consumer goods much dearer than elsewhere in the world), isolation from the outside world, the priming of the economy by inflation, and outright state coercion as virtually the only instrument of the transformations.

Does it sound familiar? Does it sound good?

I too nurtured the hope that if not the Communists then at least Zyuganov has learned and understood something from the past years. However, his program destroys all hope.

[Nikolayeva] But many commercial structures support the Communists so they must be counting on something....

[Delyagin] Yes, they are counting on the personal privileges that Yeltsin began to destroy and on the state's support.

Generally speaking, here one can only cite Vladimir Ilich [Lenin], who also received help from many commercial structures and who stated very clearly that the Russian bourgeoisie is "stupid and cowardly." This is because it has an excessively close link with the state which provides protection from competition and means that it does not have to think, fight for its existence, or show initiative.

This also applies to a large section of the bourgeoisie today. What Zyuganov has in store for it now is hardly any better than what Lenin had in store for it.

[Nikolayeva] But Zyuganov constantly talks about a mixed economy and financial-industrial groups....

[Delyagin] He talks about everything. But his policy is oriented toward intensifying state regulation as much as possible and here large-scale capital is a rival to the state. That is why Zyuganov's program envisages the conscious and consistent destruction of all components of the financial base of Russia's large-scale capital. The fuel and energy complex is to be bled dry by discriminatory price regulation, isolation will sharply reduce trade, and the short-term state bond market will simply be wiped out.

The state will restore its monopoly in society and the economy and will begin to decay in precisely the same way that it did 20 years ago.

This is the cherished dream of Zyuganov and his supporters. They didn't have time to taste the fruit of decay, others skimmed off the cream before they could "get their hands on it," as the saying goes. Their policy today is aimed at "getting their hands on it." At our expense, at the expense of all the country's citizens, at the expense of the loss of its independence and its place in the world.

At the expense of our children.

I believe in the Russian people's good sense: **This will not happen again.**

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 20 Jun

LD2006084196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0521 GMT 20 Jun 96

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 20 (Itar-Tass) — Follows a review of Thursday's Moscow-based Russian newspapers dated June 20.

Apart from highlighting the results of the first round of presidential elections, newspapers give prominence to a statement by Aleksandr Lebed at his first press conference as Secretary of the National Security Council and Assistant to the President of Russia on National Security Affairs that he had prevented an attempt made by circles close to the Defence Minister to stage the so-called Coup-3 attempt, and to a report on an assassination attempt against former National Sports Foundation chief Boris Fedorov.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA frontpages materials dealing with the first round of presidential elections under the headline "Russia is strong with the common sense of the people, not with rhetoric."

As the results of the first round of voting show, Nizhniy Novgorod has produced election results with an accurancy of up to one percent, which coincide with countrywide results. Nizhniy Novgorod region governor Boris Nemtsov has stated that sociologists need not travel about the entire country to gauge public sentiments. It is enough for them to take an opinion poll among Nizhniy Novgorod people.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA runs an article by Vladimir Klimov under the headline "Even the word of Lebed is not a sparrow" (alluding to a Russian saying that a spoken word takes its flight).

IZVESTIYA in an article by Valeriy Yakov comes forward with its own version as of who helped Aleksandr Lebed to "cook the first pancake". The emergence of Lebed in the closest entourage of the President has hardly gladened the hearts of those who regulate access to the entourage and are fine masters at ridiculing or retiring those whom they dislike or who conceived an earnest idea to be more honest than others, Yakov believes.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA comments on the assassination attempt against former National Sports Foundation chief.

The newspaper's political news analyst Pavel Voshchanov points out as follows: "We have already got accustomed that the slightest change at the top is sure to be accompanied with sensational exposes and scandals. Now that the elections have come about, a slight breeze of unwelcome upheavals has started blowing. A season of covert settling of scores has begin among the authorities."

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on the VOLTYRE factory (formerly the Volga tyre plant) aspirations.

The management of the factory tell the newspaper that for the plant to turn out enough tyres for all tractors and motor vehicles, it is necessary that taxation policy enable the enterpise to operate properly.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA carries an article by Nikolay Cherkashin giving new details about the sinking of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI reports as sensation number two of the first round of the presidential elections that over the past six months Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has lost 50 percent of his electorate.

Rem Khramov, director of the Orenburg-based Onako company, describes the problems of the petroleum industry. He believes that there is no crisis as such in Russia's petroleum sector. Neigher is there a legislative basis which would enable the country's petroleum sector to function properly and develop. His opinion is that a reasonable Taxation Code is essential. At present, 60 to 90 percent of profits are eaten up by taxes, he said.

IZVESTIYA analyses the nascent peace process in Chechnya.

In an article headlined "A war on peace", Irina Dementyeva examines the course of the peace process in Chechnya. She believes that there are people who seek to frustrate the talks between the Kremlin and the armed opposition leaders.

"An overt attempt by Doku Zavgayev not only to ignore the already reached accords but also to put up confrontation to many election-campaign statements by the President of Russia could be made only with a serious backing from Moscow".

If contrary to all the efforts madem the peace talks are frustrated this time as well, a delayed-action bomb planted for the President in the North Caucases will go off, Demenytyeva concludes.

Russia: Yeltsin Sends Congratulations on Netanyahu's Inauguration

LD1906120396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1142 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday congratulated Israel's new Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu on his official inauguration, the presidential press service said.

Netanyahu "is taking office during a pause in the efforts to reach a historic Arab-Israeli reconciliation in the Middle East," Yeltsin said in his message.

"The most important thing now is not to waste away the potential created by joint efforts after the Madrid follow-up conference and consolidate the progress reached in the Middle East settlement in the last few years," the president said.

Yeltsin expressed the hope that "Israel, like its Arab partners, will do everything possible to ensure the earliest resumption of the peace process on all tracks based on the principles approved in Madrid."

The Russian leader also reaffirmed Moscow's determination to cooperate with the new Israeli leadership in the interests of developing and advancing bilateral relations.

Yeltsin also sent his greetings to Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, who is chairing an Arab summit meeting in Cairo, and all of its participants.

"The most compelling task today is to prevent a recoil in the peace process which has already produced impressive results in the Arab-Israeli reconciliation," the president said in his message.

He stressed the need to resume advancement on all tracks of the peace process. "This will require its participants to show political will, wisdom and flexibility on the basis of principles formulated in U.N. Security Council resolutions and approved by the Madrid follow-up conference," he said.

Yeltsin pointed out that Russia continues to be interested in reaching a historic compromise in the Middle East to ensure a just peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

"As a sponsor of the peace process, the Russian Federation intends to facilitate the attainment of these goals actively," the message said.

Russia: Primakov Outlines Principal Features of Foreign Policy

LD1906195496 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1431 GMT 19 Jun 96

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 19 Jun — Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov today set out at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations the principal objectives and thrusts of Russia's foreign policy at the present time. He was attending a meeting of the academic council of the higher educational institution. [passage omitted]

The present international situation, Primakov stated, prompts the need to activate Russia's foreign policy, since that will make it possible successfully to accomplish vitally important domestic tasks — developing the economy, strengthening territorial integrity, and spurring on the processes of integration in the post-Soviet space.

Yevgeniy Primakov highlighted three trends in international relations that were negative to Russian foreign policy and which, he said, had to be resisted. They were the attempts to divide the former protagonists in the "Cold War" into winners and losers, the creation of a unipolar world, and the use of the openness of Russia's economy to turn it into a raw-materials appendage of the West.

Yevgeniy Primakov identified the question of NATO's expansion as a separate problem. "We will not and cannot veto the entry of the East European countries into that bloc," he said, "but Russia is entitled to warn the West of the extremely negative consequences of such a step." Yevgeniy Primakov sees the solution to these problems as lying in the active development of trusting and equitable relations with China, India, the Asia-Pacific Region countries, the Middle East, Latin America, Europe, and the United States — the priorities of Russian foreign policy.

As for the processes of integration, Yevgeniy Primakov went on to say that they will develop in various directions and at various speeds. That is also one of the Foreign Ministry's priority tasks, and its accomplishment will make it possible to ensure that the republics' sovereignty is strengthened and the armed conflicts ended.

Russia: Yeltsin Adviser on Decision Not To Attend Lyon Summit

LD1906153096 Moscow Interfax in English 1425 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Interfax) — President Boris Yeltsin's decision not to attend the Lyon Summit is the result of "deep thought on the future and priorities of Russia," Yeltsin's foreign affairs adviser Dmitriy Ryurikov told Interfax Wednesday.

This decision does not change Russia's relation to the G-7 countries gathering in Lyon, and vice versa, he said.

"The priorities chosen by Yeltsin are quite understandable to the leaders of the G-7," he said. French President Jacques Chirac and U.S. President Bill Clinton, whom Yeltsin informed of the reasons for his decision, will explain it to the other leaders, Ryurikov said.

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's participation in the summit "strengthens the developing relations between Russia and the world's most developed nations, especially since Chernomyrdin will receive the corresponding admonitions from Yeltsin," Ryurikov said.

Russia: Decision on Lyon Summit Bewilders, Leads To 'Speculation'

MK2006111296 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Mikhail Karpov: "The President Will Not Go to Lyons. Russia Will Be Represented at the G-7 Meeting by Chernomyrdin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday at noon a group of Russian and foreign journalist was invited to the Kremlin on a short notice. Boris Yeltsin told them that he cannot take part in the 22d conference of the seven leading industrial nations, that will take place on 27 and 28 June. The president "has made a decision not to go to Lyons, because Russia is facing a crucial period: Russia's fate will be decided in the second round of voting." The Russian delegation will be led by Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Such a serious and unexpected move naturally arouses a certain measure of bewilderment. On Wednesday [19 June], news agencies, citing "informed sources in Moscow," confirmed Yeltsin's determination to take part in the G-7 Lyons meeting "in spite of a heavy schedule at home involving preparations for the second round of the election." Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, at a briefing, assessed the G-7's acceptance of Moscow's proposal to hold the Lyons meeting in three stages, with the Russian president taking part in the last two, as nothing short of success in moving toward a full-fledged "G-8."

Talk about it has been going on for a long time now, but, in spite of what was achieved at Halifax and Naples and at the antinuclear summit in Moscow with the participation of the G-7 leaders, the "G-8" has not yet materialized. After Yeltsin's refusal to take part in the Lyons meeting, the prospect of Russia's full-fledged participation in the conference of the world's leading states will be delayed indefinitely.

Although Bill Clinton and Jacques Chirac — with both of whom Yeltsin, as he himself said, spoke yesterday on the telephone — viewed his decision with understanding, broad speculation on the reasons that prompted the Russian president to take such a move is to be expected.

There are at least two most obvious reasons. First: Yeltsin is far from sure that even the recent appointment of Gen. Lebed to key state positions will add him enough votes in the second round for a victory over Gennadiy Zyuganov. Second: The internal situation in the country in between the two rounds per se — or even following Lebed's appointment — is such that it can result in something totally unpredictable. In any event, lack of confidence in the upper echelons of power is well in evidence.

As to the Lyons meeting, it cannot be expected to produce much result. After all, according to Yeltsin, he does not know the format for Chernomyrdin's participation in it. On the other hand, the president believes that participation in this summit is very important to Russia, because it will consider support for reform and will prepare a corresponding document. It is only left to guess whether Yeltsin's absence will prompt the West to step up its support for his reformist course or will only strengthen suspicions about the possibility of its continued implementation.

Russia: U.S. Response to Grachev Ouster Viewed

MM1906172796 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Nadein: "Americans Afraid of Jinxing Yeltsin's Victory in Second Round"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington — After the congratulations to Russia's citizens and leaders which Clinton read out in connection with the success of the presidential elections, a time of waiting has come again. So far the content of the telephone conversation which took place Tuesday between the two presidents has not been made public here. Neither joy nor regret has been heard in connection with P. Grachev's departure although —

and this is admitted without reservation — he made a tangible contribution to the cooperation between the two superpowers' armed forces.

A. Lebed's rapid ascent has been commented on rather languidly by State Department officials: We do not know the man very well, they are saying, nor is it clear what he will do, so we shall wait and see. Especially as his idea of the West, as one Russian expert noted, is limited to experience of the Soviet military academy and Afghanistan. That is he has no idea at all.

To those of us who believe in a Western plot against Mother Russia the behavior of official Washington seems not so much a policy as a piece of evidence. Indeed, they are giving money for Yeltsin (if Zyuganov is elected they promise to take it back from him). General Lebed, who only recently was regarded as too nationalist, is presented as a suitable find for the present Russian president. And they fully approve G. Yavlinskiy's steps toward the Kremlin, which is seeking support.

And here — this is the moist suspicious thing — they persistently claim that America does not have its candidate in Russia, it only has national interests.

P. Grachev's departure, it is believed, will in part strengthen Moscow's opposition to NATO's expansion to the East. General Kolesnikov, Russian Army chief of general staff, is considered by Washington analysts to be one of those who is objecting almost more keenly than anyone to this Western undertaking. But that is not the main U.S. gamble. Nor is it even the continuation of democratic reforms, in which the Clinton Administration sees its own interest and for which critics are pecking at it increasingly painfully.

Now that Russia has slightly strengthened its financial position and even — for the first time since 1991 — is building up production and services and when the United States' direct monetary injections have declined to an insignificant level, Washington is restoring increasingly vigorously to a new lever for influencing Kremlin policy — access to international structures primarily trade and financial structures.

This is a very important matter for Russia and far more serious than dollar handouts. Buying and in particular selling without discrimination — that is a guarantee of normalization. G. Zyuganov's program, as it has been read in Washington, could draw Russia back into the quagmire of economic enclosure. Russian industry will suffer, the Russian consumer will suffer losses, but the West will also be deprived of an important means of influencing our policy. If the country is not interested in the international division of labor it can be placed on the correct path only with the aid of missiles and that is what no one wants.

Meanwhile Washington has one subject which is hard for it to discuss but that does not mean it will refuse to discuss it. That subject is the restoration of the USSR. Under any name. Under any sign or on any pretext. Here they are firmly convinced that "voluntary reunification" even if the armies initially remain in the barracks is a provocative policy and is objectively aimed at the restoration of the empire.

That is why the Duma decision to consider the USSR's dissolution illegal generated such a tough rebuke. In combination with the Communists' intention to restore elements of an economy planned from the center this, Washington is convinced, is the start of the path at whose end lie mutual suspicion, a "cold peace," and, very likely, the Yugoslavization of the CIS.

In extremely cautious terms representatives of the Administration are expressing hopes that Yeltsin will succeed in the second round of the voting. "Mr. Yeltsin seems to have the advantage in gathering together a coalition doomed to succeed," THE NEW YORK TIMES writes. "The Communists' attraction is strong but it is weakening and Mr. Zyuganov still has to dispel fears that he will restore a dictatorship."

However much officials may keep silent, their preferences are clear. They see a future with Yeltsin and not with Zyuganov. And so they prefer to behave cautiously to avoid jinxing him.

Russia: European Response to Grachev Ouster, Lebed Rise Viewed

MM1906161296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Yevgeniy Bay: "Good News from Moscow Has Caused Confusion in NATO and Almost Panic Among Moscow's Former partners in Eastern Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO's reaction to Grachev's removal and Lebed's ascent was instant, as though the generals there were sitting and waiting for this news from Moscow.

"There are no special changes... the situation is not deteriorating, it may improve, but it will hardly deteriorate" — that, in a rather contorted way, was how the changes in the top level of power in Moscow were analyzed by a high-ranking NATO representative as reported by REUTER.

At the ceremony to present the new Russian Security Council secretary another foreign observer commented on the situation "Yeltsin looked like a successful fisherman who has just caught a fantastic specimen and is now showing it off to the gathering."

"Today these two politicians look like father and son," echoes a third.

Observers recall that Lebed has frequently made highly critical remarks about Yeltsin. In an interview with REUTER in September last year, for instance, he noted that "it is time for the president to take retirement and start growing strawberries" (quotation from REUTER).

Such caustic remarks must be forgotten after the two politicians have sworn loyalty to each other. But in the opinion of foreign analysts the risk remains. Is Yeltsin, accustomed to treating his aides exclusively as subordinates, and not equals, in a state to give Lebed real powers? Will it not turn out that Lebed will be able to implement his own program much more successfully than Yeltsin and more rapidly than Yeltsin would like and receive excessively high political dividends?

Actually, the West is now more interested in something else. NATO officials are afraid that the almost Pinochet-like combination of Lebed's firm-handed policy and the liberal economic platform could make Russia far more unpredictable for dealing with.

"The Russia which emerges from these elections becomes a pricklier nationalist partner, whoever wins the second round of the elections," London's FINANCIAL TIMES believes.

The West seems to be ready to pay that price for Yeltsin's victory. Which you cannot say of Moscow's former partners in East Europe.

Adam Michnik, the former Polish dissident who publishes GAZETA WYBORCZA, the most widely read newspaper in Warsaw, asserts that the voting has revealed the weakness of Polish democracy. "In 1990 they (Yeltsin, Zyuganov, and Lebed) were all members of the same party. They all represent traditions and a political culture distinct from the standards of European democracy to the same degree that Russia differs from all the West European states."

One conclusion is obvious — they must force on the question of entry into NATO. This week it will be discussed at a very high level in Warsaw. Taking part in the NATO planning conference will be the secretary general of that organization, the presidents of at least three states — Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic — and the defense ministers of Germany and Britain and high-ranking NATO strategists from Brussels.

It is reported that representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry have also been sent invitations but they declined to make the trip.

The organizers of the conference were understanding: For the Russian generals the elections are now more important. But when a president has been elected in Russia NATO, with some disquiet on the part of its permanent members and obvious fear on the part of those seeking membership, expects Moscow to make its positions more specific.

Russia: Primakov Discusses Japanese Islands, NATO Expansion

LD1906173296 Moscow Interfax in English 1634 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Interfax) — The Russian-Japanese territorial dispute over four Kurils islands cannot be solved now. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov told the students and staff of the Moscow State University for International Relations (MGIMO) Wednesday.

This issue can be solved neither on the basis of Russian proposals, nor on the Japanese-proposed platform, he said.

Primakov, however, did not exclude the possibility of using the experience of Japan's relations with China. "Beijing proposed the two countries put off the bilateral territorial dispute for consideration by future generations, and the Japanese agreed," he said.

"Maybe, this model should be used as a basis for Russian-Japanese relations, while all other areas of cooperation should be intensively promoted," he said.

Primakov categorically opposed the proposed NATO enlargement to the East.

"If tactical missiles with nuclear warheads are located near our territory, given that their flight time is shorter than that of the destroyed medium-range missiles, are we supposed to hail this thing or what?"

Russia does not close the case of NATO expansion and is ready to consider it, Primakov said. "But Russia is not that kind of country, and it is not the moment, to agree to NATO expansion," he stated.

"A dialogue and a compromise are required," Primakov said. However, there is one area, the advance of NATO infrastructure to Russian borders, where no compromise is possible. Other aspects can be negotiated, he said.

"Russia may have good relations with NATO, and we should build these relations on a healthy basis with a non-expanding and evolving alliance," Primakov said.

The first signs of NATO's evolution are already visible, he said. "The more NATO evolves to the side required for peace and stability, the more confident is Russia that the alliance will not move its infrastructure toward our territory, the more impetuses we have to develop relations with the North Atlantic alliance," he said.

Russia: Russia Ready To Resume Military Cooperation With FRY

LD1906134696 Moscow Interfax in English 1248 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 19 (Interfax) — Russia is ready to resume military-and-technological cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) proceeding from the need to maintain the military-strategic balance in the region, a high-ranking Russian diplomat told Interfax on Wednesday.

The U.N. Security Council held a session last night and said that its members did not object to a full removal of the military embargo against the former Yugoslav republics.

The agreement on military-and-technological cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was signed while the international sanctions were being applied to Belgrade, the same source said, adding that the agreement will now come into effect.

However, the diplomat declined to say whether Russia was ready to develop cooperation with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on an equal level. The diplomat made it clear that this would depend on the implementation of the agreement on regional stability that they signed in Florence several days ago.

Under the agreement that was signed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and the federal and Serb Bosnian governments, the number of servicemen and the quantity of arms in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's army must be 50 percent of troops and arms existing in the region, while the armies of Croatia, the Moslem-Croat Federation (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina) must have 20 percent of the existing troops and arms in the region apiece (for a total of 110 percent).

The military embargo will in fact be removed automatically, following a corresponding report by the U.N. secretary-general, if the U.N. Security Council does not make a different decision on the matter, the Russian diplomat said.

Under resolution 1021 of the U.N. Security Council, the embargo concerning the supply of small arms to former Yugoslavia was removed in March 1996. The embargo's full removal will signify the removal of the ban on the supply of heavy weapons and ammunition, the diplomat said.

However, the Florence agreement imposes restrictions on the quantity of different kinds of weapons, including heavy weapons, in the armies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and the two Bosnian governments, the diplomat stressed.

"If a massive supply of one of the Yugoslav sides with arms begins, Moscow will not welcome this. An uncontrollable increase in military supplies to any of the sides will not fit into the logic of Yugoslav settlement," the Russian diplomat said.

Russia: Mikhaylov Appointed Russian Coordinator in Tajikistan

LD2006100996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0937 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, June 20 (Itar-Tass) — The functions of Coordinator of the activities of representatives of Russian Federal executive power bodies in Tajikistan are to be performed by Yevgeniy Mikhaylov, envoy plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation. He himself told journalists about that after a meeting with Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmanov.

"I shall devote attention equally to both political and economic matters, for everyday experience has shown that these problems are closely interconnected, and it is essential to tackle them simultaneously and in their aggregate," Mikhayiov said.

The envoy plenipotentiary believes that it is necessary for the sides involved in the inter-Tajik conflict to make headway step by step, by agreeing on compromises, towards a positive settlement of the conflict peacefully. Russia as the observer side at the talks will promote that in every way, Mikhaylov emphasised.

Political Issues

Russia: Yeltsin Fires Soskovets, Korzhakov, Barsukov

LD2006085596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0851 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin has fired First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, head of the president's security staff Aleksandr Korzhakov, and Director of the Federal Security Service Mikhail Barsukov, Yeltsin told journalists Thursday in the Kremlin.

Russia: Yeltsin Says 'Power Structures Should Be Replaced'

LD2006091896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0910 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh and Aleksandr Nechayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 20 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin dissmissed his personal security chief Aleksandr Korzhakov and Security minister Mikhail Barsukov on Monday [day as received] after an incident which the new security supremo Aleksandr Lebed qualified as a "mutiny" aimed to disrupt the second round of elections.

Yeltsin also said on Thursday he had dismissed first deputy premier Oleg Soskovets who was viewed as a close friend of Korzhakov.

"With the aim of strengthening and renewing the team I have relieved first deputy chairman of the government Oleg Soskovets, head of the Federal Security Service Mikhail Barsukov and head of the security service of the president Aleksandr Korzhakov. It is necessary to change the staff. I have been always reproached for Barsukov, Korzhakov, Soskovets. Should the president work for them?" Yeltsin told TASS.

"The power structures should be replaced. They began to take too much on them and to give too little", Yeltsin added, but stressed that "it has never happened that I worked by Korzhakov's suggestions".

The president did not name the possible successors. "We are currently discussing that issue", he only said.

Korzhakov, known as the "Grey Cardinal" in the Kremlin because of his close links to the president, shocked the country when he said a month ago that Russian elections should be postponed.

On Wednesday night two of Yeltsin's leading campaigners were detained on orders of Korzhakov and Barsukov for allegedly taking out a big amount of hard currency from the government building.

Lebed immediately interfered and after a meeting of the Security Council Yeltsin announced the dismissal of Korzhakov, Barsukov and Soskovets.

The dismissal of the hard-line officials was a condition set by democratic forces for the support of Yeltsin in the second round.

Russia: Yeltsin Says Dismissals Aimed at 'Rejuvenating' Team

LD2006105296 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 20 Jun 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received the footage from the Kremlin on which, as it were, a turning point not only in careers and in political life, but in Russia's history itself is imprinted. [video shows Yeltsin standing in an office, smiling]

[Begin Yeltsin recording] Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the government, Barsukov, head of the Federal Security Service, and Korzhakov, head of the president's security service, have been relieved of their duties with the aim of reinforcing and rejuvenating the team, as I said before.

Go quickly, because I am giving you hard-hitting news. If I come out to say something, I do indeed have something to say.

One has to make changes, you understand. One has to change one's staff, to get fresh people in.

I have been reproached for having Korzhakov, Barsukov, for having Soskovets, and so on. As if the president was supposed to do their jobs for them!

To cut a long story short, we have had to reshuffle the power-wielding structures because they have begun to take too much and give too little. [end recording]

Russia: Yeltsin: Firings Not Connected With Earlier Arrests

LD2006094696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0929 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh and Aleksandr Nechayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 20 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin dismissed his personal security chief Aleksandr Korzhakov and Security minister Mikhail Barsukov on Monday after an incident which the new security supremo Aleksandr Lebed qualified as a "mutiny" aimed to disrupt the second round of elections.

Yeltsin also said on Thursday he had dismissed first deputy premier Oleg Soskovets who was viewed as a close friend of Korzhakov.

"With the aim of strengthening and renewing the team I have relieved first deputy chairman of the government Soskovets, head of the Federal Security Service Barsukov and head of the security service of the president Korzhakov. It is necessary to change the staff... I am giving you all the key news", Yeltsin told Tass on Thursday.

"I have been always reproached for Barsukov, Korzhakov, Soskovets. Should the president work for them? The power structures should be replaced. They began to take too much on them and to give too little", Yeltsin added, but stressed that "it has never happened that I worked by Korzhakov's suggestions".

Tass learned that the decrees to sack the three officials had not been signed yet. Yeltsin decided to dismiss them after a brief meeting with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin which took place right after the session of the Security Council on Thursday at which its new chairman Aleksandr Lebed was introduced. After talking to the premier Yeltsin met his leading campaigner Anatoliy Chubays.

Yeltsin said the dismissal of the three officials was not linked to the incident with the detention of his two campaigners Sergey Lisovskiy and Arkadiy Yevstafyev.

The President said the incident was "a technical affair". "I do not know the details, but it was a technical affair as the top leaders told me. The entry-exit regime was violated. There was a detention and a check of what they were carrying with them", he said.

On Wednesday night the two campaigners were detained on orders of Korzhakov and Barsukov for allegedly taking out a big amount of hard currency from the government building.

New security supremo Lebed immediately interfered saying he would "sort it out".

The president did not name the possible successors to the three key posts. "We are currently discussing that issue", he only said.

Korzhakov, known as the "Grey Cardinal" in the Kremlin because of his close links to the president, shocked the country when he said a month ago that Russian elections should be postponed.

The dismissal of the hard-line officials was a condition set by democratic forces for the support of Yeltsin in the second round.

Russia: Yeltsin Replaces Korzhakov With Krapivin

LD2006112096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1107 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 20 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin replaced his dismissed personal security chief Aleksandr Korzhakov with Yuriy Krapivin, the head of the Federal bodyguard service, which is reponsible for the protection of top officials.

Krapivin was appointed acting head of Yeltsin's personal security service, according to a decree signed on Thursday.

Russia: Dismissed Korzhakov Vows To Support Yeltsin

LD2006114496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1119 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Interfax) — Aleksandr Korzhakov, who was sacked Thursday as chief of the Russian president's security service, has said that his exit from the ranks of Yeltsin's close entourage does not change his principles or views.

"I have backed the president and will continue to do so. Let those who would like to engage in speculations around my name not even attempt to do this. I am not quitting the president's team and will do my best for (President) Boris Yeltsin's victory in the runoff. Now the president's security service is smoothly going over from the command of one chief to another," he told Interfax.

In comment on the news conference in Moscow granted by one of the heads of Yeltsin's election headquarters, former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays, Korzhakov said: "It was 100 percent lies. I am sure Chubays is a delusion for Russia."

Korzhakov said that was neither in the government building known as the Russian White House nor in the Kremlin last night.

"I had a good night's sleep at my dacha (summer cottage)," he said in response to an Interfax question.

Russia: Filatov Says Barsukov, Korzhakov 'Contantly Interfering'

LD2006054996 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0516 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 Jun (Itar-Tass) — Sergey Filatov, head of the All-Russian Movement of Public Support for Boris Yeltsin, described as "disgraceful" the detention on 19 June of two active participants of the Russian president's election campaign Sergey Lisovskiy and Arkadiy Yevstafyev.

He said Mikhail Barsukov, director of the Federal Security Service, and Aleksandr Korzhakov, head of the Presidential Security Service, "are constantly interfering in Boris Yeltsin's election campaign, which is impermissible in their positions."

In Filatov's opinion, Korzhakov and Barsukov fear the increased influence of Aleksandr Lebed, who has recently been appointed secretary of the Security Council and aide to the president on matters of national security. The heads of the said power-wielding structures, Filatov said, "want to push Boris Yeltsin into the background, and are grossly interfering in the president's personnel policy."

Russia: Liberal Team Gets Upper Hand in Yeltsin's Entourage

LD2006121196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1151 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Itar-Tass) — The "unrecorded sum of hard currency", which Federal Security Service ex-Director Mikhail Barsukov claimed to be the reason for the arrest of two activists of the President's election campaign, was actually a "bomb" planted under Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's seat. Aleksandr Korzhakov and Mikhail Barsukov, wanted Oleg Soskovets, who was First Vice-Premier until June 20, to replace Chernomyrdin.

Itar-Tass has learned from high-ranking sources in the Kremlin that efforts to sell the skin of an uncaught bear began within Yeltsin's immediate entourage from the very outset of the election campaign.

Chief of the Presidential Security Service Aleksandr Korzhakov managed to install First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets as the head of Boris Yeltsin's Election Headquarters.

However, the latter's clumsy actions in this capacity gave the liberal part of the President's entourage a chance to regroup the Election Headquarters. Viktor Ilyushin, the President's First Aide, and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin headed it in spring.

Aleksandr Korzhakov and his closest ally Federal Security Boss Mikhail Barsukov began to lose ground. Nevertheless, highly valuing Korzhakov's and Barsukov's personal loy[illegible], the President included the two in his Election Council.

This is when the "tug-of-war" began within the team.

In spite of the President's advice to Korzhakov "not to meddle with politics", voiced after the latter's provocative statement on the need to postpone the elections, the Presidential Security Chief continued to constantly interfere with the already adopted political and personnel decisions. According to Head of the All-Russia Yeltsin Support Movement Sergey Filatov, Korzhakov had obstructed the election campaign of St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak. Taking the floor at a recent meeting of the Election Council, Korzhakov recommended Sergey Filatov, Georgiy Satarov, and Anatoliy Chubays not to appear on television.

The last event that prompted Korzhakov and Barsukov to make the last stake, was the recent meeting between Anatoliy Chubays and Aleksandr Lebed, when the latter was appointed to the posts of Secretary of the Russian Security Council and Presidential National Security Aide. Realising that if the retired General joined the Liberals, he would pose a serious threat to the heads of the two security services, Korzhakov and Barsukov decided to discredit Lebed. Today, shortly before his dismissal, the Chief of the Presidential Security Service told journalists that Lebed should not interfere with politics right from the beginning.

It seems that the President's patience regarding the secret intrigues of General Korzhakov and General Barsukov was exhausted. He admitted to this today after dismissing the two generals and Soskovets from their posts.

Of course, this scandal will not be helpful to the President's election campaign. But, on the other hand, the liberal intellectuals and the independent press, which regarded Yeltsin's entourage as a threat to the formation of a civil society and believed it was fraught with the danger of authoritarianism, can now heave a sigh of relief and confidently urge all the democratic public to vote in the second round of the elections for the Russian President, who is so consistent and honest in his actions.

Russia: Broadcast of Chubays' Statement at News Conference

LD2006113196 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian
0930 GMT 20 Jun 96

[Opening statement by Anatoliy Chubays, member of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's campaign staff, at a news conference in the international press center in Moscow — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Good day, dear friends: Now we can calm down a bit since all the main events have already happened. That is how I assess what has been happening in Russia over the past four days. That is how I assess the events of the past few days.

You know full well what happened last night. There was an attempt to arrest two key members of Yeltsin's election headquarters. I would like to say that by itself this event is a concluding phase in a rather protracted and difficult struggle — the struggle between one part of Yeltsin's administration that was working for Yeltsin's victory in democratic elections, and another part of Yeltsin's administration that preferred to resort to strong-arm decisions. In fact, today we can say for sure that it was Soskovets, Korzhakov, and Barsukov who were leading that section of the Russian leadership that was pinning its hopes on strong-arm methods in tackling the election tasks in Russia.

This has surfaced on many occasions recently. In fact, it surfaced last February when Yeltsin had to remove precisely this team from the organization of his election campaign. However, they did not sit idle. They made an effort to prepare fresh conditions for strong-arm solutions in Russia. You know very well that in the past some members of that team let it slip and even directly said that the Russian elections should be postponed. It was this reasoning that led to this crisis after the first round of the election.

In essence, this crisis is connected above all with Boris Yeltsin's victory in the first round of the election, which made almost pointless the attempts to direct the situation toward strong-arm solutions. The supporters of the use of force lost their last hope when Yeltsin made his second decision two days later — the decision to appoint General Lebed secretary of the Russian Security Council.

Yeltsin actively started renewing his team. As you know, he did not confine himself to appointing Lebed to the post of Security Council secretary; he began by dismissing Pavel Grachev. It is not surprising that at that point our dear gentlemen, Korzhakov and Barsukov, and their spiritual father, Mr. Soskovets, realized that they could not hope to stay in power unless they resorted to some kind of strong-arm solution.

With every day, with every hour, the last hopes for a strong-arm solution to the problem of the elections in Russia were ebbing away. It is with this that I link the mindless provocation that those gentlemen opted for during the night between yesterday and today, when they staged a provocation, and arrested two key members of the president's team who were engaged in electoral work, in an effort, I think, to attain strategic goals. The situation was not straightforward in its development. It had its moments of drama, and President Yeltsin put an end to the situation one hour ago. As you know, he decided to dismiss Mr. Soskovets, Mr. Korzhakov, and Mr. Barsukov from their posts.

I would particularly highlight the role played in that process by Lebed, the newly appointed secretary of the Security Council, who by his toughness, firmness, and his ability to clearly and consistently uphold the aims that are set out in his program, named "Law and Order," gave Boris Yeltsin vital support at a crucial moment for him.

In effect, we have witnessed how the newly-formed political union has not just confirmed its viability, but it has proved that it is within the bounds of this union that the Russian authorities are capable of overcoming the most serious, the most dangerous crises of power at any level.

As I see it, three days ago, when Boris Yeltsin appointed Lebed secretary of the Security Council, the last nail was knocked into the lid of the coffin of the history of Russian communism. Last night and today, when Boris Yeltsin decided to fire Soskovets, Barsukov, and Korzhakov, the last nail was knocked into the lid of the coffin called the illusion of a military coup in the Russian state.

It is absolutely clear to us that this is a powerful, tough decision on the part of the president, that it testifies yet again to the unique political potential of that person. It is evidence yet again of his striking ability to assess everyday happenings in-depth and strategically and to make the decisions on them that are absolutely what is needed at absolutely the right moment. Or, generalizing on what has been said, I think that what happened today means the inevitable victory for Yeltsin in the second round of the presidential elections on 3 July this year.

Russia: Rutskoy: Yeltsin To 'Settle Scores' With Chernomyrdin

LD2006120096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1132 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 20 (Interfax) — Presidential candidate and leader of the Communist Party of Russia Gennadiy Zyuganov has so far refrained from commenting on the reports that President Boris Yeltsin has dismissed First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Mikhail Barsukov and chief of the presidential security service Aleksandr Korzhakov.

Interviewed by parliamentary reporters, Zyuganov said that he had not seen the presidential decree on that score yet.

At the same time the Communist Party leader believes that this step by the president is evidence that he lacks confidence in everything.

Asked whether the personnel reshuffles in the government had increased or lessened his chances in the second round of the election, Zyuganov said, "We have very good chances and we are working calmly."

Meanwhile, one of the members of the council of the Popular-Patriotic Bloc, former Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy said, "This is surrender and it began a while ago." Rutskoy believes that since October 1993 Yeltsin has "settled his scores with everybody. Chernomyrdin alone is left and I am certain that Yeltsin will eventually settle scores with him, too."

Russia: Seleznev Sees Financial Reasons Behind Recent Dismissals

LD2006115196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1123 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Itar-Tass) — Contrary to explanations of President Yeltsin concerning the reasons for the removal from their posts of Aleksandr Korzhakov and Mikhail Barsukov, State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev told journalists today that, most probably, they were dismissed because they "encroached on the most sacred thing: the shadow financing of Boris Yeltsin's electoral campaign."

Barsukov, head of the Federal Security Service, and Korzhakov, head of the President's Security Service, as well as First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets were relieved of their duties "for purposes of strenthening and renewing the team" and because "it is necessary to replace the old power structures with new ones: they began to take too much upon themselves and give too little in return," President Yeltsin told Tass.

Speaking about Oleg Soskovets, Seleznev said that he was in tandem with ex-Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. "Oleg Nikolaevich was in charge of the defence industries, and there were a lot of complaints about his performance ... I do not know what exactly he is being accused of, but, most probably, he deserved the dismissal," he added.

In the opinion of Seleznev, it is necessary to study carefully the statements of Aleksandr Lebed, new Secretary of the Security Council, about the State Emergency Committee-3 (the third attempted coup d'etat), disrupted by him. According to Seleznev, those statements mean that the conversation in Grachev's recreation room was bugged, and it is quite possible that "the conversations of each of us are bugged." Seleznev called attention to the fact that the statements, which he described as "vague", had been made against the background of "dramatic changes" in the President's team.

Russia: Yeltsin Removes Grachev, Lobov From Security Council

LD2006095896 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0940 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 June (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued an edict "On Changing the Membership of the Security Council of the Russian Federation" today relieving Pavel Grachev and Oleg Lobov of their duties as members of the Russian Federation Security Council. The press service of the Russian Federation president has reported this.

Russia: Ex-National Security Aide Baturin Interviewed on Dismissal

MK2006090496 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with Yuriy Baturin, former presidential national security adviser, by chief editor Vitaliy Tretyakov under the "Resignation" rubric: "Yuriy Baturin Learned About His Resignation From the President Himself. Boris Yeltsin Asked Him To Stay on for Another Month To Hand Business Over to Aleksandr Lebed" — on 18 June, place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] My meeting with the former presidential national security adviser occurred in the evening of 18 June, on the day of his resignation. Through a number of indirect indications I was able to guess that Yuriy Baturin expected that this might happen, at least for several weeks before his dismissal. For this reason he probably did not refuse NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's request that he send the text of the presidential message on national security to our paper, apparently for fear that otherwise it would not be published at all.

But on that evening I did not ask Yuriy Baturin this or any other equally sensitive question.

[Tretyakov] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, do you understand the main motives behind the president's decision concerning you?

[Yuriy Baturin] What is unclear about them? This is a political decision for the purpose of creating a coalition.

[Tretyakov] What I mean is not that Lebed was given this post, but that he was given your exact post; there has recently been no public criticism of your work, either by the president or by the "soft" opposition. It was not envisioned that, in the creation of a coalition, you would be sacrificed.

[Baturin] I do not think that Aleksandr Lebed himself demanded this addition to the post of Security Council secretary.

[Tretyakov] Have you already met with him?

[Baturin] Not yet, but I am sure we will. Particularly so because during my meeting with the president, Boris Nikolayevich asked me to continue supervising those areas that my staffers and I have dealt with — at least for another month, because Aleksandr Ivanovich will need about that long to learn what's what.

[Tretyakov] Did it come as a surprise to you that the president made this decision regarding you on this day?

[Baturin] That he did it precisely on this day? Yes, it did.

[Tretyakov] I hope you did not learn about it from media reports?

[Baturin] No, the president called me today in the morning (18 June) at approximately 0910 and said: Your functions will be somewhat modified. How? — I asked. Boris Nikolayevich said: It is Lebed who will be the national security adviser. I guessed that, I replied, but what will I be doing? I have to think, was his response. Later, I met with the president; we discussed a number of technical matters as well as the future of my staffers. Then an edict was issued appointing me to the post of presidential adviser upon relieving me of my post as national security adviser.

[Tretyakov] And what if one month does not prove long enough for handing over your job?

[Baturin] I will not try to artificially draw out this period.

[Tretyakov] What if you are offered the traditional post of ambassador to a respectable country?

[Baturin] No one has made such proposals to me. And besides, I would not like to leave the country at this juncture.

[Tretyakov] Could your resignation mean that the presidential message on national security, which was drawn up by your group, would have to be sent to the archive?

[Baturin] I do not think so. It was signed by the president, who studied very carefully the next to the last draft, which was, incidentally, published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA-STSENARII. Drawing on his comments we prepared the final version, which was signed by the president on 13 June.

[Tretyakov] But the new national security adviser might think otherwise, might he not?

[Baturin] In that case he will evidently have to defend his ideas before the president.

[Tretyakov] Have you met with Lebed before?

[Baturin] Only once, in 1994, when I had an informal meeting with a group of generals to discuss a number of problems pertaining to national security. Lebed was also present there.

[Tretyakov] How did he strike you?

[Baturin] As someone who in real life has little in common with his television image.

[Tretyakov] Are your telephones silent today?

[Baturin] Direct-line telephones have been silent — apart from Boris Nikolayevich's call. From among the chiefs of the agencies with whom I have been, ex officio, in constant contact, only two have called me today. But there have been many other phone calls, particularly intercity calls.

[Tretyakov] If you finally leave the presidential staff — by the way, is this possible — what will you do?

[Baturin] If no interesting job is offered to me, of course, I will go. And in four months or so I will make a decision.

[Tretyakov] And what will you do during the four months?

[Baturin] I will continue teaching and will also be restoring my physical condition. Four years of work nearly round-the-clock without days off cannot help but leave their mark.

Russia: Yeltsin Explains Decision Not To Attend Lyon Summit

LD1906152496 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1300 GMT 19 Jun 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The fate of Russia will be decided in the second round [of the presidential elections], Boris Yeltsin declared today in the Kremlin, reinforcing his statement with a step that was no less decisive.

[Correspondent M. Tumanova] At the meeting in Lyon from 26 to 29 June, the heads of the world's eight leading countries are to discuss, specifically, the question of supporting the reforms in Russia. [passage omitted].

[Begin Yeltsin recording] After taking advice and thinking it over myself, I took the decision not to go to Lyon, to give up that trip, because at that time here in Russia, a very important time, Russia's destiny will be decided by [the question of] who will be elected president. And not only the destiny of Russia. In my view, it will greatly influence the situation in the world. [end recording]

[Tumanova] The president declared that Jacques Chirac and Bill Clinton, whom he informed today of his decision, understood his reasons.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] Chernomyrdin will attend the sittings there. By what formula, they will decide there, of course. He is not the president, but, nevertheless, I think that it will be suitable for Russia. Of course, I was expected there. But, all the same, here every day [is valuable]. The electoral campaign starts tomorrow, according to the law. Ryabov declared today that he will be finishing all his calculations tomorrow and will publish the data. From then on, it will be legitimate to conduct an electoral campaign. [end recording] [video shows Kremlin and Red Square scenes, followed by Yeltsin coming into a room to face correspondents]

Russia: Yeltsin Presents Lebed to National Security Council

LD2006082396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0749 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Itar-Tass) — Russia's National Security Council met in the Kremlin at 11:00 on Wednesday, one hour later than expected.

President Boris Yeltsin presided over the opening of the National Security Council meeting and presented the newly-appointed Secretary to the powerful Security Council.

The Secretary, popular general Aleksandr Lebed, was appointed to the post last Tuesday and had a working meeting with the President on Wednesday. He was also appointed national security adviser to the President.

"I do not think there is any point in recounting his (Lebed's) combat service record. I move that he be confirmed," the head of state said, and added after the vote, "Unanimously. Congratulations, and on to the battle!"

"I serve the Fatherland!" Lebed replied.

According to Boris Yeltsin, Aleksandr Lebed will be personally in charge of strengthening the security of society and the individual, as well as of political stability in Russia.

Russia: Lebed Agrees To Join Commission for Settlement in Chechnya

LD2006120696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1143 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20, (Interfax) — Russian Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed has agreed to join the State Commission for Chechen Settlement. The chief of the state commission's press-service, Sergey Slipchenko, said Lebed gave his consent in a telephone conversation with the commission's secretary, Sergey Stepashin.

He said that Stepashin would brief Lebed on June 24 on progress in the negotiations with the Chechen armed opposition and the commission's performance in general.

Slipchenko failed to confirm reports that the chief of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Chechnya, Tim Guldimann, and one of the Chechen separatist leaders, Movladi Udugov, had arrived in Moscow.

"Stepashin talked with Guldimann on the phone earlier in the day and even the possibility of such a visit was not discussed," Slipchenko said.

He said that some of the commission's members would fly to the Chechen capital of Groznyy next week to continue efforts to settle the conflict by peaceful means.

Russia: Lebed Comments on Security Council Tasks, Chechnya

LD2006115096 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 20 Jun 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Aleksandr Gurnov] A session of the Security Council, at which the president officially presented Aleksandr Lebed, ended in the Kremlin an hour ago.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] I do not think there is any need for me to talk about his military career. Alright, you all know about it? Are there any questions? No. Do I have a proposal to endorse him? So it is endorsed unanimously. Congratulations, Aleksandr Ivanovich.

The main directions of national security that Aleksandr Ivanovich will regulate personally are the strengthening of security of society and the individual, and the strengthening of political stability in Russia. Here we have a vast field of activity. [end recording] [video shows Yeltsin addressing members, with Lebed standing on his immediate left]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Aleksandr Ivanovich, you attended the first session of the Security Council today and took up your duties, how did it go and what kind of questions did you discuss?

[Lebed] I was presented to the Security Council and we had a very brief discussion on questions of crime and corruption, and certain measures were mapped out.

[Correspondent] Was the situation that occurred yesterday discussed in the Security Council?

[Lebed] What?

[Correspondent] The situation with Lisovskiy and Yevstafyev, was it discussed at the Security Council today?

[Lebed] No, the question was of no interest to me and of no interest to the president.

[Correspondent] A question on Chechnya and the war. Your first steps as secretary of the Security Council and your immense powers — what steps do you think will be taken in the near future?

[Lebed] I have already said, we must not be guided by the principle of fast-track solutions, and that is what you are trying to do when you say how will we start, and what first steps will you plan, and what you have been entrusted with. Maybe, I will first implement them and then be entrusted with them, I do not know.

[Correspondent] At the session today did you acquaint the members of the council with your plans to set up an institute of authorized representatives of departments?

[Lebed] The president has given me carte blanche in this respect and I will make the Security Council a working body, with the main criterion professionalism and no "good" people. [end recording] [video shows Lebed being interviewed]

Russia: Security Council Staff 'Hurt' by Lebed Remarks

MM1906175396 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Tamara Zamyatina: "Lobov's Job in the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Former Security Council secretary Oleg Lobov was surprised to learn from the media that as first vice premier he would be overseeing the power ministries. Yesterday Sergey Kolesnikov, head of the government information administration, denied this hasty hypothesis. Indeed, it would be hard to image the former and the new Security Council secretaries tilling one and the same field.

According to an influential source in the Russian Federation government, Oleg Lobov is more likely to be offered a job in his specialty — overseeing construction, in particular in Chechnya. It would be logical, this source believes, if Oleg Lobov were to become first deputy chairman of the State Commission on Chechnya (at the moment Vladimir Kadannikov is filling in for Viktor Chernomyrdin as head of this commission).

The transfer of Oleg Lobov and the appointment of Aleksandr Lebed were greeted with skepticism in the Security Council. Specialists in the national security sphere reacted sardonically to the retired general's statements that he already knows how to establish order in the country, although he has not yet even embarked on a study of all aspects of the problem. And if some analysts from the Security Council were prepared to take the measure of the new chief, once he declared his intention to remove the entire council apparatus from the payroll [vyvesti za shtat] and organize "shock therapy," many will have been hurt and will have started trying to find work outside the Security Council.

Actually, Aleksandr Lebed had already caused a shock with his first statements about having eliminated a threat from a "SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] Mark 3" in the Defense Ministry. But in his desire to uncover secret plots he will have many rivals in the Presidential Security Service and FSB [Federal Security Service].

Russia: Extent of Lebed's Power Still 'Difficult To Tell'

MK1906120796 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Will Russia Become a Lebedyan? [land of swans] Grachev Refused To Hit the Deck and Do the Pushups"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Your MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS correspondent has learned some details of Pavel Grachev's resignation. Monday afternoon he was summoned to the Kremlin. In a one-on-one meeting with Grachev the president said that he considered "noteworthy" the idea of appointing Aleksandr Lebed to the post of Security Council secretary. Pavel Sergeyevich [Grachev] said that if the appointment goes ahead, he will have to resign. Boris Yeltsin nonetheless stated firmly that he was "inclined" to appoint Lebed. After that Grachev took a sheet of paper out of his briefcase, wrote a letter of resignation, said good-bye, and left. Later in the evening he went to the Defense Ministry, where he met with his associates and sat with them until late in the evening. Then he collected his things and vacated the office of the defense minister.

Yeltsin Ceded Three for One Lebed

The alacrity with which Boris Yeltsin conducted a series of major personnel changes in the country's top leadership, seeking to win Aleksandr Lebed over as an ally, cannot but evoke respect. To achieve the requisite result, the president, without a second's hesitation, got rid of Pavel Grachev (appointing Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov acting defense minister). He transferred Yuriy Baturin, one of the most sensible people in his inner circle, from the post of national security adviser to a simple aide with a purview "not as yet defined by the president." The unsinkable Oleg Lobov became the third first deputy premier (an excellent promotion for a man who in his time proposed improving the cattle fodder situation by raising the production of coniferous meal). As a true commander, Boris Yeltsin "spares no ammunition" to achieve final victory.

Aleksandr Lebed, well before 16 June, said that he needs "executive powers." After 14 percent of the voters cast their ballots for him it became clear that he will get these powers. Furthermore, given the general's anti-Communist statements, it was also clear that it is easier for him to strike a deal with Yeltsin, who can, moreover, grant him the sought-after powers, than with Zyuganov. And so, yesterday he said: "There are two ideas in the country: the old one, which has led to much bloodshed; and the new one, which is still being implemented very poorly. But it has a future. I opt for the new one."

The expeditiousness with which Yeltsin carried through these changes points not only to the president's determination, but also to the fact that many of his moves were prepared in advance. In any event, it would be silly to doubt contacts between Yeltsin and Lebed well before the first round. Both conducted their campaigns quite tactfully with respect to each other (especially in the last week before Election Day), and it seems that some accords were reached.

At the same time Grachev's resignation means that Boris Yeltsin has put everything on the line. Now he will have no way of keeping the Communists out of the Kremlin by using force, if they win the elections after all. To be sure, neither Kolesnikov nor anybody else in his place will then be able to "resolve the problem by using the option of force." Therefore now it is all up to the voters to decide, and Yeltsin is ready to accept their choice. He has cut off all "escape routes" for himself.

Thus far it is difficult to tell what functions Aleksandr Lebed will perform: The federal law "On the Security Council" has not as yet been adopted. The functions of Oleg Lobov, the general's predecessor at this post, included the preparation of Council agendas and the formalization of its decisions. According to responsible sources, Yeltsin, after hearing the opinion of Council members, would rise and say: "Thanks, everybody," making the final decision himself. Neither did the national security adviser have much clout. Yuriy Baturin was rather a think-tank.

Lebed did not take part in yesterday's session of the State Commission on a Settlement in Chechnya because "it will take some time for Aleksandr Lebed to study the scope of his responsibilities. At the same time it is essential for Aleksandr Lebed to learn as he goes along, working in the commission, in order to realize his plans and ideas," commission secretary S. Stepashin said. Presumably Chechnya will become the first issue for the new chief national security specialist.

Clearly Lebed hopes that he will be making many decisions himself, and will also personally oversee their implementation. The future will show how the two burly muzhiks [men] will get along within one Council. Aleksandr Lebed made quite a successful military career under the wing of Pavel Grachev, and therefore he is not averse to "generals' diplomacy," typical of that milieu. It is hardly likely that he will immediately begin to swing around his sword, "like they do in the movies." And he has pretty good chances of settling down in the Kremlin. True, he always has the option to "take offense and quit," loudly banging the door.

But, in order to start, Yeltsin and Lebed will have to snatch victory in the second round from Russia's chief Communist, or neither of them will see the Kremlin again — and that is not going to be at all easy....

Russia: Implications of Lebed Appointment Viewed

MM1906124196 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Feliks Babitskiy: "A Predictable Concession"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Lebed's appointment as secretary of the President's Security Council and presidential aide on national security, like his unprecedented success in the elections, surely surprised only those people who do not read the newspapers regularly.

As for his success, the general made steady regular progress toward it. The first time that Lebed was described as a most promising leader was in summer 1992 when within a few hours he ended the war on the Dniester which had begun that same day — 18 June — exactly four years ago. The "victory parade" that he organized in Bendery then may be regarded as the start of the presidential campaign. What was relatively unexpected, however, was the partial defeat of the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO] headed by Aleksandr Ivanovich in the recent parliamentary elections. Fortunately for him the team this time did not include the deadly ally Yuriy Skokov who is worth a dozen enemies. Thus our hero finished in his rightful third place.

The general's new appointment was equally inevitable and, let us note, was planned in advance by the president's team. Zyuganov has grounds for expecting to increase his vote in round two by taking Zhirinovskiy's votes. And even though those votes do not amount to very much, the general secretary does not need very many votes if the president fails to win over those who in round one opted for the "third force." But whereas the majority of liberal voters who opted for Yavlinskiy and Fedorov will probably switch their votes to him, Lebed's voters need to be sure that the general and the president are on the same team.

Admittedly, Yeltsin has taken a clear risk in taking Lebed on board. Were the elections to be held in the West, where the voters are disciplined, it would be a different matter. But our sociologists can still only guess how far a candidate can influence his voters. So whereas in round one Lebed took most of the so-called "protest" votes, which previously went to Zhirinovskiy, the Communists, and even the Beer Lovers' Party and some other dark horses, it is still not certain that he will now be able to switch all his votes to the president. But having made his choice, Aleksandr Lebed will have to stick with Boris Yeltsin to the end and share whatever fate has in store for the leader.

But the fact is that both the president and the general have never been afraid to take risks. Both men's whole careers have consisted of risky and sometimes seemingly irrational moves which have almost always resulted in victory. Generally speaking among all our politicians only Lebed is similar in character to Yeltsin, including even minor character traits, despite the 20-year age difference. This is probably why the journalists are increasingly actively discussing two phrases once uttered by the president: "My successor must be of my height and take my kind of risk." One tall politician was so pleased with this that he even went out specially and had a "Yeltsin-look" haircut. The second phrase that everyone is still repeating was heard literally on the eve of the elections and again relates to the figure of the successor. "I know my successor in the 2000 elections and I would stand down in favor of him now." Observers are asking: Is this new appointment not the beginning of a gradual transfer of power?

I believe, however, that it is too soon to talk of a transfer — before round two of the elections. But assuming that Yeltsin is going to win the elections I would like to say a few words about the appointment itself — what prospects it offers both for the boss and for his new subordinate. And why the general has been given two posts at once and why those particular jobs rather than any other?

It is no secret that previously everyone discussed mainly the possibility of the general's appointment as defense minister. There was a time when Lebed (as commander of the 14th Army) was ready to accept. But now when the outcome of the elections depends on his supporters' votes it would demean his status to accept a ministerial portfolio and possibly offend his voters, which would only benefit the Communists. Once again the situation in the Army today is such that dispatching someone to reform it is the same as sending someone to develop agriculture was in Gorbachev's day.

Having made his choice Aleksandr Lebed will now share the responsibility for major political decisions with the president. If one assumes that the president really regards him as his successor the general simply has to undergo this schooling. On the other hand, given Aleksandr Ivanovich's explosive and excessively independent character, while in the capital he would do better to remain in the leader's field of vision than at the command post. In addition, his loyalty is guaranteed by the appointment of his predecessor Oleg Lobov as vice premier, who is also responsible for the "power" structures, as well as by the appointment of Chief of General Staff Kolesnikov, a member of the old staff elite, as acting defense minister.

The president has made a predictable concession. It is now up to the voters to support the alliance between Boris Yeltsin and Aleksandr Lebed and thereby approve the idea of Russia's development.

Russia: Lebed Expected To Have Trouble Working With Kremlin Staff

MK1906124496 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Tatyana Malkina: "Aleksandr Lebed Has Assumed His Duties as Savior of the Fatherland. The General Has Received the Post of Security Council Secretary and Immediately Prevented a Small Military Riot"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] It is unclear yet what forces Mr. Lebed will use to fulfill his obligations. He is planning to start with an extensive reorganization of the Security Council. By law, however, a Security Council secretary has in fact no managerial functions. At the same time, in Mr. Lebed words, the

Law on the Security Council "is probably bad, but it will be observed rigorously." Aleksandr Lebed claims that Boris Yeltsin has already given him some "additional powers" so that he can put the new ideology of order into practice. This, however, could require amending the Constitution, to which the Duma will hardly agree even if the president chooses to do so.

The radical character of Aleksandr Lebed's statements and the general impressiveness of his figure is giving rise today to more questions than answers. It seems that the Kremlin would like to control his actions. For the time being, however, Aleksandr Lebed does not show any traces of obedience: He said yesterday that he "did not intend to bother himself" with any reflections as to how well he fits in with the Kremlin staff. Meanwhile, some people believe that he will be no fit at all, since it will be hard for him to deal with the staff and subtle paperwork. In addition, many of his future neighbors in the corridor and subordinates (like the head of the Federal Security Service [FSB]) react to the alien if not with open hostility then without particular affection.

It is also unclear how two men with very similar specifications — one of whom is almost officially the president-2000, whereas the other is not yet the president-1996 — can coexist in one Kremlin.

In addition, there is another general question: Where, after all, will General Lebed's voters go in the second round? And, should they even go in the right direction, how long after this will Aleksandr Lebed be allowed not to bother himself with reflections on what is to the Kremlin's liking and what is not?

Military Issues

Russia: Effect of Grachev's Resignation on Military Brass Viewed

MK2006073096 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Igor Korotchenko under the general headline: "A New Broom in the President's Hands"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] The introduction of troops into Chechnya and all the subsequent events graphically showed the worth of the defense minister, his competence, and professionalism. Both the democrats and the intransigent opposition demanded Grachev's resignation. Boris Yeltsin himself finally understood that just shortly before the presidential elections. On 21 May NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA published an article entitled "Grachev's Resignation Practically Inevitable" which, citing sources in the Kremlin, said that the president had decided to get rid of the "best defense minister" on 3 or 4 June. The ranking Russian Presidential Security Service officer who reported that information to us was mistaken only about the time frame. The resignation occurred two weeks later.

Pavel Grachev will probably go down in history as the most unpopular Russian defense minister in the last few decades. His successor will inherit a legacy that can hardly be envied.

According to reports from military districts the officers and generals corps reacted to Grachev's resignation without regret, while officers at a number of military academies in Moscow were yesterday even congratulating each other on this notable event. The former defense minister's close associates are apparently in a state of confusion and fear for their future. Everybody is anxious to see who will become the new leader of the Defense Ministry.

A similar mood exists among the chiefs of some special structures within the General Staff who have shown — let's put it this way — an interest in the content of the cellular phone conversations by Aleksandr Lebed and members of his election office.

They might get off with only a scare, however. Some ranking officers who engaged in the "electronic hunting" of President Boris Yeltsin during the days of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, and who suppressed the Russian president's communication facilities in the besieged White House, and who were interrogated by the General Prosecutor's Office as part of subsequent criminal proceedings, continue to hold their positions at the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It is difficult to say whether this is an oversight by the presidential special services or if it is by the design of somebody with far-reaching aims. True, Aleksandr Korzhakov's subordinates can easily bring it up by turning to the corresponding volumes on the criminal case against the State Committee for the State of Emergency.

Russia: Moscow Commander Kuznetsov Said Liked in Defense Post

MK2006111896 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Sergey Anisovyy [military political scientist]: "Who Will Be the New Defense Minister?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pavel Grachev's resignation, and the appointment of Aleksandr Lebed to the position of Security Council secretary and national security aide to the Russian Federation president, have put a spotlight on the entirely new prospects for personnel as well as on the alignment of forces among the leadership of Russia's army and navy. Who will be appointed as the new defense minister? Observers and some experts mechanically cite the generally known names of members of the so-called "military opposition" — Generals Boris Gromov and Valeriy Mironov, as well as First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin and FPS [Federal Border Service] Chief Andrey Nikolayev — who are close to some of the political elite in Russia.

It is hard to go along with such assumptions. Most likely, lobbying in the media for the above figures are forces that want these very same men appointed. The Luzhkov-Kobzon team is behind Gromov; behind Mironov are the Communist-patriots and kindred spirits of the quiet opposition in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. The men in the Kremlin surely know about this and, most probably, they read about this with an ironic smile in those newspapers that seriously speak about these generals as aspirants for the minister's portfolio. Kokoshin is not going to be appointed, if only because his image is largely associated with Gaydar's revolutions and the years of stagnation in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry when Pavel Grachev was at the helm. Also, and for the same reason, General of the Army Mikhail Kolesnikov is a nonstarter; he is the chief of the General Staff who is the current acting defense minister. The "General's brat," Andrey Nikolayev, is quite probably an unsuitable figure for a "worker and peasant" like Lebed for social reasons. As for Nikolayev himself, he would hardly like to trade something bad for something even worse; he is up to his ears in work along the border.

Those hoping for the position of defense minister that Lebed and Yeltsin have in mind today are supposed to be loyal to today's Kremlin leadership and have no "political sins" on their record, because, owing to a possible sharpening of the election campaign, the degree of subordination of the army and the navy to the supreme commander in chief would depend on whomever it is. It is also he who will be doing the "dirty" work of cutting and reforming the army. And he is supposed to be apolitical and to know Moscow and its leaders well. Thus, the choice falls upon those serving within the bounds of the capital, who know the situation among the troops, have experience of controlling military districts, who have served with high-level staffs, and who are competent in things military (who graduated from the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Academy).

Such aspirants are few. One of the most loyal to Yeltsin is General of the Army Konstantin Kobets. But Lebed would hardly have him by his side: too many "dirty" political fights are in his record. And then, he is a communications expert by training. He knows the basics of combined-arms combat, military art and strategy and can use them in an "abridged" form, on barricades and in what may be an approximation of street fighting.

The present deputy defense ministers — Colonel Generals, Anatoliy Solomatin, Vladimir Churanov, and Vladimir Toporov —can hardly count on the high post. They "must have been in the cookie jar" and Lebed bears them a grudge.

Some observers name Colonel General Igor Rodionov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy, among possible aspirants. Rodionov actively participated in the KRO's [Congress of Russian Communities'] election campaign effort. Many of Rodionov's ideas are included in the KRO's and Lebed's election platforms. But Rodionov is implicated in the "D-handled shovels" affair as the Transcaucasia Military District commander who broke up an antigovernment meeting in Tbilisi in 1991 with the help of troops. At the time he was set up by Yazov and Gorbachev, but many still remember the "Tbilisi syndrome" and it will surely be recalled by those around Yeltsin. Besides, Rodionov will be 60 this year and under the law has to be discharged from the armed forces. As a compromise decision, Igor Rodionov may be appointed to the position of Russian Federation Armed Forces General chief of staff in place of Kolesnikov.

Chief Commander of the Ground Troops Vladimir Semenov could be eligible for the position of defense minister. He has been in his present position since 1991. Prior to the disintegration of the USSR Armed Forces, his position was designated as commander in chief of ground troops and deputy USSR defense minister. Semenov is regarded among the Russian Federation Armed Forces as one of the most competent generals, well able to express his own point of view. He criticized, on more than one occasion, the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the country for belated funding of the army and the navy, which negatively impacts on the country's defense capability. But Lebed may turn down Semenov's candidacy since he had repeated squabbles with the ground forces leadership in connection with prematurely reforming the 14th Army in the Dniester Region, which many people know he commanded.

In the meantime, many Defense Ministry and General Staff experts think there is a most flawless candidate for the position of Russian defense minister. He is 58-year-old Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov, commander of the Moscow Military District. He is no stranger in the Kremlin. He is personally known to General Korzhakov with whom he was in contact more than once in the line of duty. Some friendly mutual understanding is rumored between Korzhakov and Kuznetsov, something that got

Grachev — who could not stand the intelligent and judicious Kuznetsov — jealous. Kuznetsov is apolitical, but he supports Yeltsin. It was he who, realizing the acuteness of the electoral struggle, expressed the opinion in May 1996 that the elections should be postponed. Many people in the Russian Federation Armed Forces think that the general is reserved enough, intelligent and that what he said about a possible postponement of the election indicates the really difficult political situation in the Russian Federation. This is the only political step taken by Kuznetsov — ever.

Cautious and quick-witted, Kuznetsov acts resolutely in critical situations. When he was chief of staff of the Western Group of Forces [ZGV], he was one of the few generals who did not support the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] in August 1991. Few people know that Kuznetsov had a row over this with ZGV Commander in Chief Matvey Burlakov.

But, at that time, thanks to Leontiy Kuznetsov's firm stance, telegrams with pledges of support for the GKChP never left Wuensdorf and never reached Moscow.

Thanks to his resolute actions in September-October 1993, he managed to hold the army back from becoming involved in the conflict with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. An able, knowledgeable and exceptionally strong-willed leader, he enjoys deserved prestige among the troops. There is no evidence that he ever used conscripts to build his own dacha. His pine-log "shack" is in glaring contrast with those built from red brick by the other officers and generals of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the armed forces.

Federal Assembly

Russia: Duma Security Committee Leader Supports Lebed Appointment

OW2006084096 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Jun 96

[Statement by S. Sigarev, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for Security; from the "TeleUtro" program; place and date not given — live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not everyone in the State Duma reacted to the new appointment of General and Deputy Lebed in the same way, and, in particular, in our Committee for Security. But as committee deputy chairman and as a professional, I fully approve of this appointment. You know there is a wise biblical saying: You will recognize them by their deeds. So through his deeds and by his previous professional activities, Aleksandr Lebed has demonstrated his right to occupy the position permitting him to play a key role in questions of security.

Today, security issues, both external and internal, are extremely topical for Russia. Bringing about and maintaining order in the country is the number one task. It is true that Lebed is still a young politician, however, he is a very experienced organizer who is acquiring political savvy very quickly. I envision fruitful cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of power in solving security issues in the person of Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed, as representative of the Security Council, and, of course, the Russian State Duma Committee for Security.

I agree that the range of my deputy colleagues' political predilections is extremely broad and some of Lebed's political views, say on the ways and methods for developing economic reforms in Russia, may not be acceptable. However, on the most important issues, and I think that the most important thing first and foremost is the security of our motherland and our countrymen, we are all united. Lebed's slogan — right and order — corresponds first of all with the aspirations of all Russians.

Voices can be heard about the danger of a new Pinochet-style dictatorship, of a firm hand, and of Bonapartism. However, if Lebed had not initiated a political alliance with the current president, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, then fears of this sort could have been plausible. However, the fact that this alliance became reality, thank God, and the fact that the position of the president reformer, carrying out democratic — I repeat democratic — reforms with such colossal efforts, and the position of the military man who is accustomed to a precisely organized way of life eventually coincided must gladden all patriotic Russians. Both of them, the president and the general, exhibited political farsightedness that I hope will eventually find the support of the majority of our deputies corps.

Russia: Duma To Debate Bill on Extending Voting Period

LD2006093296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0916 GMT 20 Jun 96

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Itar-Tass) — "The bill to extend the time of voting during the second round of the presidential elections will be debated at a plenary meeting of the State Duma on Friday, June 21," Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev told ITAR-TASS today.

The bill, tabled by the "Russia is Our Home" faction and the "Russian Regions" parliamentary group, envisages the extension of voting time from 6 a.m. to midnight. In accordance with the Law "On Presidential Elections in the Russian Federation", the the first-round voting was held from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m.

Seleznev said that the amendment to this bill, tabled by democratically-oriented MPs, had evoked differing views at today's regular meeting of the Duma Council. "I think that many MPs will object to this proposal," he said.

Seleznev also said that the communist faction in the State Duma had yet not determined its stand on this issue.

Regional Affairs

Russia: OSCE Mission Head Meets Yandarbiyev in Chechnya

LD2006093696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0916 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, June 20 (Interfax) — Head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Chechnya Tim Guldimann met yesterday with Chechen separatist leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and discussed with him how the work of the commissions should be organized to efficiently implement the agreements signed in Moscow and Nazran.

Guldimann is "optimistic about the prospects of further talks between the federal authorities and the Chechen armed opposition," he said in an interview with Interfax on Thursday.

"There are certain difficulties" in the negotiations now, said Guldimann. "Both sides accuse each other of violating the agreements," he said.

He refused to comment on both sides' complaints and said that his task is to help "the negotiations to proceed."

Nevertheless, he said that so far there are no concrete decisions on the date and the venue for further talks.

Russia: Chechen Separatists Promise To Honor Reached Agreements

LD2006083096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0742 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (Itar-Tass) — President of the self-styled "Republic of Ichkeria" Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Chief of Staff of the Chechen separatist detachments Aslan Maskhadov are set on strictly adhering to the accords with the federal authorities, signed in Moscow and Nazran. Their forces were "strictly ordered not to engage the federals and only to resort to defensive actions". The two separatist leaders gave these assurances to Tim Guldimann, Head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Mission in Groznyy, in the course of the Wednesday consultations, Information Minister of the "Republic of Ichkeria" Movladi Udugov told Itar-Tass by telephone today.

He also said that the meeting with the federal side, scheduled for Friday, was put off due to the recent aggravation of the situation and the need to hold further consultations.

Udugov claimed that the Russian military were constantly violating the reached accords by firing on Chechen populated localities while the separatists were observing them. In such cases, Udogov admitted, the separatists have open reply fire.

In the meantime, military sources in Groznyy report that separatists had fired on federal positions 23 times over during the past 24 hours and were continuing to wage a mine war against the federal forces.

The Russian troops in Chechnya, Udugov claimed, "are demonstrating their unloyalty to the Moscow political leadership and actually refusing to obey it".

In turn, the Russian military say that the accords are being violated by the separatists. These agreements, Chairman of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Lieutenant-General Andrey Ivanov told journalists on Wednesday, are being used by them to build up their forces and expand their zones of influence. Small armed gangs, which have radio contact between each other, are staging provocations against the federal troops.

Russia: Chechen Commander Halts Revenge Operation Against Russians

LD1906143196 Moscow Interfax in English 1235 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SOUTHERN CHECHNYA, June 19 (Interfax) — Head of the headquarters of Chechen separatist fighters Aslan Maskhadov has ordered field commander Pashe Israpilov to cancel an operation against the 276th regiment of federal forces stationed in Chechnya's southeast.

At the same time, Aslan Maskhadov's strict order "not to respond to provocations of federal forces and not to independently carry out any combat operations" is still in force among detachments of Chechnya's armed opposition, a representative of the headquarters told Interfax.

Israpilov planned to carry out a combat operation against the 276th regiment as an act of revenge for the murder of the Magomadovs family by servicemen of this unit in the village of Kurchaloy in the early hours of June 16, the source said.

Noting this is not the first case of a provocation since the agreements on a package of military issues were signed in Nazran on June 10, the Chechen military said that the leadership of the armed opposition demanded the federal party jointly investigate this case and punish the guilty in line with the Nazran agreements.

Russia: Chuvash President Discusses Elections, Chechnya

LD1906171496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1214 GMT 19 Jun 96

["Exclusive" report: "HUMAN RIGHTS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN TERRITORIAL UNITY—NIKOLAY FEDOROV"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President of Chuvashia (a Russian internal republic in the Volga Area) Nikolay Fedorov is a professional attorney and was for several years Russia's Justice Minister.

Later, however, the ethnic Chuvashi Fedorov returned to the land of his forebears.

He is the representative of the Council of Europe Commission on Chechnya. He has been to the war-ravaged republic many times and met with its leaders. He has played a significant role in the developing peace process there.

A Council of Europe delegation visited Chechnya on his initiative, and on the basis of what he had done there.

Chechnya was the main theme of Fedorov's conversation with an Interfax correspondent. Naturally, the conversation could not avoid hitting upon the Russian elections as well.

IF [INTERFAX]: You have now entered the Chechen peace process as the representative from the Council of Europe Commission on Chechnya, while two years ago your position on the conflict drew sharp criticism from Moscow. Has the situation or your opinion changed?

FEDOROV: Nothing of my opinion has changed. Perhaps I am one of those too-refined attorneys in politics, but in January 1995, as now, the important thing for me was and is the legal aspect of the issue.

I am completely convinced that if a collision arises between the values of a country's territorial unity and the threat of a violation of human rights, and large-scale and blatant ones at that, then the collision must be overcome in favor of human rights.

I look at the war in Chechnya entirely through the prism of this logic. Therefore I consider the actions of federal authorities in sending troops into Chechnya as unconstitutional and as a violation of human rights. The observance of axiomatic legal rules has been good for everyone everywhere, even though it may deny someone's momentary political needs.

We lost morally, politically, historically, and finally, economically in the Chechen conflict. This is now clear. But a year and a half ago, my position was not met with understanding in Boris Yeltsin's circle. I felt a certain coolness in relation to me.

Having worked four years as Russia's Justice Minister, and having lived through four government teams, I know how all these elite political games work. And I knew full well, who was distancing the president from me and the issues of Chuvashia, and why. You have to give Yeltsin his due — he kept on top of the situation, and when we finally met in person, I was able to convince him I was right.

IF: Yet after your famous statement of resignation and decree forbidding the residents of Chuvashia from serving in Chechnya, which was cancelled by Yeltsin, you stayed in the shadows, away from the peace process. Was it you realized the futility of your efforts?

FEDOROV: I just didn't come out with loud statements or demonstrative actions, but instead worked on the specific problems of the social welfare of our boys who ended up in the "hot spots." Incidentally, my decree was directed toward that as well. Only now has the time come for lawyers.

IF: Despite frigid relations with Moscow, you were able to sign an agreement on division of powers with Moscow three weeks ago. What specific issues does it resolve?

FEDOROV: We were able to work out a totally original document, not imitating, as many do, the Tatarstani-Russian agreement. The agreement clears up a fairly specific number of economic problems in Chuvashia. And since the center kept away from solving them, we had to overcome serious resistance, though not from the politicians, like, for example, with Tatarstan, but from the bureaucrats.

For example, the agreement gave an impetus toward solving the issue of chemical weapon destruction, which upset the generals. The center also agreed to support the Cheboksary energy system, the reservoirs, and the tractor factory, which was in a difficult financial situation, but not because of us.

There are also what I would call "legal" achievements in the agreement. The center is not allowed to unilaterally make decisions, cancel my decrees, and make cadre changes if these contradict the norms of the agreement. In case of a collision, a joint commission is formed. Unfortunately, power in Russia historically leans toward the Byzantine tradition. The will of the government is the law, and a bureaucrat's decision is the equivalent of a court sentence. This agreement, though, tries to turn the sides to the law.

IF: Chuvashia is a fairly state-subsidized region, unlike Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, who want economic self-sufficiency and are able to afford it. Is it possible to carry out an independent economic policy while being dependent on the center? Is this independence for you a blessing, a burden, or a fiction?

FEDOROV: The fact that there's no oil in Chuvashia, like there is in Tatarstan or Bashkortostan, does not mean that it cannot flourish economically. There are other things which can get a republic out of a crisis.

In Boris Yeltsin's evaluation, for example, Chuvashia is today a dynamically developing region, when just a little while ago it was one of the more depressed regions. How were we able to do this? First of all, we created an off-shore zone, lowering taxes for banks, insurance companies, and fledgling companies, which allowed for the unprecedented inflow of both Russian and foreign capital.

Foreign investment in our little republic now equals 100 million Deutschmarks, up from zero two years ago. One of Chuvashia's advantages is its location, and we have tried to get the greatest possible gain from that, having received the promising status of a inter-regional commerce and transport center.

For this we needed to bring our roads and bridges, our Volga ports and moorings into order, and rebuild our airport. Heavy planes can now land there. And the main thing, along with the Siemens company, we were able to provide Chuvashia with a modern communications system, with satellite, cellular, and paging.

This cannot help but attract investors, and the results are there. We have already begun receiving additional revenue in the tens of billions of rubles. And in volume of construction per capita, we are not only ahead of rich Tatarstan, but of Moscow as well.

In fact, we have been able to lower subsidies from the center form 12 percent to 7 percent in the last two years. And that 7 percent is how much we spend on maintaining federal objects.

IF: It turns out then that, having tasted independence under the current regime, you would not want the Communists, who have promised to halt this process, to come to power. Yet Gennadiy Zyuganov's supporters are dominant in your republic. How do you get along, for example, with your Communist-dominated parliament?

FEDOROV: Fairly peacefully. Rights are the priority for me. That is why what happened, say, with Kirsan Ilyumzhinov (President of the Republic of Kalmykia), who dispersed his parliament, or with Mordovia ex-President Vasiliy Guslyannikov, when the Supreme Soviet cancelled his post as such, cannot happen here.

The people, not the parliamentary deputies, should decide. We held a referendum in December, for example, on the issue of the utility of keeping the presidential post. What is characteristic is that more people supported me in December 1995 than voted for me in December 1993. If any collisions arise, I turn to the law. That is how, for example, I argued with the Russian Constitutional Court the attempts of our State Council to change the law on elections.

IF: Are you hoping that you will be able to outmaneuver, as a lawyer, the Communists in Moscow also, if Zyuganov wins the presidency in the second round?

FEDOROV: I view that possibility as purely theoretical. Knowing your rights was not an advantage under a totalitarian regime. But a lot has changed since then. If the Bolsheviks after winning do not go back to their revolutionary, illegal, and criminal methods like in 1917, then there is a chance that leaning on the law, we will be able to keep them in bounds. There are people in the regions who will resist them.

Economic Issues

Russia: Yeltsin Decrees Help for Small-Scale Produce Growers

MM1906121096 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Yelena Ishkova: "100 Billion for Gardeners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mini agricultural producers — that is, people who produce radishes and other "non-serious" agricultural produce on their own plot of land — will receive assistance from the state thanks to Boris Yeltsin's edict "On State Support for Gardeners, Truck Gardeners, and Smallholders." This will happen for the first time after decades of subsidies to state and collective farms. Hitherto it has been considered that the country is provided with agricultural produce exclusively by collective agricultural enterprises. Millions of people's work on their own patch of ground and their output did not count, as it were.

This injustice was first raised by private farmers, who joined with gardeners and smallholders in the Union of Landowners of Russia. They drew the government's attention to the fact that state subsidies of all possible kinds already equal in money terms or even exceed the volume of agricultural production in the so-called public sector. Although for four years now state and collective farms have not been the country's main food providers. They have been squeezed hard on the market by private growers, who operate much more efficiently. In the words of Deputy Economy Minister Ivan Starikov, around half our milk and meat and the overwhelming majority of potatoes and vegetables are produced outside state and collective farms.

And now the injustice has started to be eliminated. Although the 100 billion rubles which the presidential edict has promised from the state leasing fund for the purchase of equipment and tools is nothing compared to the money envisaged by the state budget for the collective sector. But the important thing is that things have started moving. Soil cultivation equipment hire centers will be set up for private growers. The government has been instructed to expedite the submission to the State Duma of draft laws "On Smallholdings" and "On Collective Horticulture and Truck Gardening." Under these laws small-scale agricultural producers will be exempted from paying contributions to nonbudget funds. Starting next year funds will be included in the federal budget for long-term credit (15-25 years) for the construction of cabins [domik]. Admittedly the introduction of concessionary train fares was somewhat delayed, and right up until last Sunday dacha owners had to pay no less than before. The desire for internal affairs organs to intensify protection of gardeners' property still exists only on paper: A few days ago a neighbor's garden cabin was burglarized again.

The state and collective farms' monopoly on the market has long since been destroyed. Smallholders, private farmers, and gardeners are taking produce to market which is both better quality and more diverse. Agricultural joint-stock companies' and partnerships' monopoly in obtaining money from the state pocket has now been smashed too.

Russia: Official Predicts Major Problems With Harvest

LD2006101896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0930 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, 20 Jun (INTERFAX) — Harvesting will be difficult this year because of the delays in the spring sowing campaign and the acute shortage of harvesting machines, Ivan Gridasov, head of the main crop-growing department of the Russian Farming Ministry told INTERFAX.

The number of grain-harvesting combines dropped by 25,800 from 1 June 1995, to 1 June 1996, and the agrarian sector has only 64 percent of the 400,000 to 450,000 grain harvesters needed. The harvesters will have to bear double or triple working loads, delays are imminent in the harvesting campaign, and crop losses will be inevitable, Gridasov said.

To be able to harvest all the crops in time, the agricultural sector must get 90 percent of appropriate budget allocations before 1 October. The government must tighten control of the delivery of fuel and lubricants to the agricultural sector, Gridasov also said.

A total of 58.1 million hectares of the planned 69.3 million hectares has been sown to date. Cereals and legumes have been sown on 37.2 million of the planned 41 million hectares, sugar beet on 1.035 million of the planned 1.113 million hectares and sunflowers on 3.4 million of the planned 3.925 million hectares.

Areas sown with forage crops — oats and barley — have been reduced but areas sown with wheat have been enlarged by 1.1 million hectares. Wheat has been sown on a total of 25 million hectares for the first time since 1986.

Russia: Vice Premier Kazakov on Privatization Progress, Problems

MM1906145496 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Dmitriy Dokuchayev: "Vice Premier Aleksandr Kazakov: 'Ministries Not Capable of Efficiently Managing Blocks of Shares'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This point of view was expressed by the head of the State Committee for the Management of State Property, who was addressing the Moscow VIP Club. By way of an example of the "efficiency" of state management, he cited the notorious "Norilskiy Nikel" Joint-Stock Company, whose income during the year was 6 trillion rubles [R], while its expenditure was R17 trillion.

On the Course of Privatization

Privatization is proceeding, although not at such a fast pace as before. Around 700 enterprises have been privatized since the beginning of the year. The future of this process is naturally linked with the continuation of the current political line.

On Attacks on the State Committee for the Management of State Property

A difficult situation has recently developed as regards privatization, as a result of actions undertaken by opposition forces. The leaders of territorial committees for the management of property in a number of oblasts (Chita, Tambov) have been subjected to persecution and the home of the first deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State Property was searched. (According to information at the editorial office's disposal, the person concerned was Petr Mostovoy — D.D.). If a head of administration who supports the opposition comes to power in a particular oblast, then he traditionally immediately starts attacking the results of privatization and the people conducting it in the region.

On the Implementation of the Budget

A clearly exaggerated figure was set for budget revenue from privatization this year — R12 trillion. The State Committee for the Management of State Property is using a number of new approaches in order to carry out the budget task. One of these is the division of property with Federation components in exchange for money. If a region wants to keep a particular enterprise under its control, it will have to pay the center for this. This approach, which has already been put into practice at a number of enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Kray and Novosibirsk Oblast, could bring R5 trillion into the treasury. Another method is the sale of land. There is a normative base for this, but at the moment there is no good will on the part of the Ministry of Finance. If there were, it would be possible to count on another R4 trillion. Furthermore, the sale of blocks of shares in major enterprises is continuing (Svyazinvest, Rosneft), as well as the holding of mortgage auctions. Without them, it is simply impossible to "tear away" the ministry from the management of enterprises.

On Relations with the Moscow Mayor

Kazakov "inherited" this problem from Anatoliy Chubays, whose differences with Luzhkov were well known. Kazakov noted that one of the reasons for this conflict was the obstinacy of both characters. Now relations between the Committee for the Management of State Property and City Hall are normal. Luzhkov is trying to do a great deal in his own way. But, since all his actions are aimed at reforms, this is justified. Furthermore, the Moscow mayor has a special role. Whereas all the other heads of administration travel to be received by Russian ministers, then conversely, ministers travel to be received by Luzhkov. And this is normal.

On Communism

Aleksandr Kazakov cited a definition from the old Dal Dictionary: "Communism is a political teaching on the rights of each person to what belongs to someone else."

Russia: Rise in Securites Influenced by Government Reshuffle

LD1806160296 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1424 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 18 (FIA-Interfax) — Quotations for corporate securities rose by 10 percent this morning against the end of trading on Monday [17 June], a rise influenced by new Russian government appointments and resignations, a Moscow investment company told INTERFAX's Financial Information Agency.

The company's representatives linked the rise with the appointment of General Aleksandr Lebed, a presidential candidate who failed to qualify for the second round of the elections, as secretary of the Russian Security Council and with the resignation of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.

The considerable growth in quotations for shares in privatized companies, which began on June 17 due to the returns of the first round of the presidential elections that gave President Boris Yeltsin an advantage over other candidates, continued on Tuesday.

The alliance between Yeltsin and Lebed, as well as Grachev's dismissal, has significantly increased Yeltsin's chance of winning the runoff, where he will face Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, brokers say.

Yeltsin's re-election for a second term will bolster the activity of investors in the Russian market and contribute to the attraction of new capital, brokers believe.

An insignificant correction of prices because of the strong growth began on the market at 1:00 p.m. By the end of today's trading, quotations had risen by some 5 percent against the previous day.

Quotations for Russian stock will continue to rise in the next few days, market operators said, adding that however the pace of growth is likely to be slower than on Monday and Tuesday.

Russia: Yeltsin Has Sold Out Electronics Industry

MM1906145596 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Jun 96 p 7

[Article by Professors Aleksandr Portnov and Eduard Voronkov under the "Hard To Believe" rubric: "'Reformers' Have Drained Russia's Brains"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Do not think that these words [reference to headline] are not meant literally or have been thought up "for effect." Not at all. B. Yeltsin really has caused a brain drain inasmuch as he has destroyed the Russian electronics industry.

In our day and age it is only those countries whose technological level permits the production of their own microprocessors that we call developed countries. Any country that has no multiprocessor "electronic brains" of its own is doomed to intellectual dependence and decline. It will, in the full sense of the word, use other people's brains and its specialists will be reduced to the level of monkeys with the ability only to press buttons.

At present a bitter economic World War III is being fought on Earth and B. Yeltsin bears personal responsibility for betraying Russia's interests in this war. He has not only destroyed Russian industry but also the sphere in which its intellect is concentrated — the mighty Soviet electronics industry. During the period of so-called stagnation even the "senile" L.I. Brezhnev managed to invest enormous sums of money — around $200 billion — in the development of the electronics industry! A powerful base was created with plants in Zelenograd and Fryazino in the Moscow region, Nizhniy Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk, and elsewhere. If skillfully executed, conversion could give Russia an opportunity to organize the mass production of microprocessors — "electronic brains" for satellites, aircraft, missiles, television sets, and washing machines — to satisfy the needs of the domestic market and for export.

But this was by no means what the enormous U.S. corporations like Intel, IBM, and others had planned, and B.N. Yeltsin, as if carrying out an order from across the ocean, not only did not develop everything that had been created by his predecessors but destroyed it in a very brief period of time! A vast quantity of microprocessors produced in the USSR were criminally written off and dispatched as scrap metal in order to extract from them a minute quantity of gold alloy. A large quantity of microcircuits were exported abroad for next to nothing: Who is responsible for these criminal acts?... When all is said and done, the president! Production of microprocessors has now ended in Russia, and for this reason developed countries such as the United States, Japan, Britain and others can already contemptuously regard Russia as a developing country. The problem is that they are doubly right: Russia is not even a developing country, it is a **country falling into decline**! This new global economic concept was put into practice by the "reforming" efforts of our president, who was in self-imposed isolation behind the walls of the Kremlin and, like Gorynych the Serpent [figure from Russian folklore — FBIS], spitting fire when any threat was made to his rule.

How can the Russian Defense Ministry manage to do without microprocessors? It emerges that for its most secret processing it...buys them abroad! Here is a decision worthy of our president! It once more demonstrates to the whole world his amazing ability to chose the most stupid of stupid decisions!!! After all, the Defense Ministry does not know — nor can it know — what particular program has been loaded into the imported "brains" which have been shipped in from the United States and, let us assume, mounted in missiles. Microprocessors only obey their real masters — and only a Pentagon or CIA password enables a missile to be aimed at a target specified by Washington!... Such questions are painstakingly studied by thousands of first-rate specialists responsible for questions of the United States' national security, including quite a few engineers who were thrown out onto the street in Russia by B. Yeltsin and went off abroad! You see, they took with them **knowledge** worth hundreds of billions of dollars, and the Russian president couldn't give a damn. Who is now working on questions of Russia's security?... Who knows, it appears that no one is. All that is important to the president is his personal security, and he has succeeded very well in this area — his bodyguards are top-notch!

Why is Russia now inundated with gaudy foreign trash and low-quality produce while the domestic light and food industries have been destroyed? Because the destruction of domestic industry has enabled the money that was "released" to be squandered on the purchase of enormous quantities of imported goods that are past their sell-by dates! Among the many thousands of plants and factories that have been closed down are microprocessor plants that are **strategically essential** to Russia. The results of Yeltsin's reforms are well known: Russia's industrial potential has more than halved! According to UN statistics, Russia has plummeted to 27th(!) place in the world in terms of industrial development. On the other hand it has the "honor" of being in fifth place (out of 54 countries) in terms of the level of corruption of its officials! Was it not they who, with the direct connivance of the president, made the decision to destroy the electronics industry? After all it is not only production of microprocessors that has been ended but production of monocrystals, including flint, germanium, and gallium arsenide, which are the basis of microcircuits!... The latest secret technologies have been taken out of Russia by specialists who have been free to leave Russian companies and to go off to Israel, the United States, and the FRG.... They have also been bought up on the cheap by representatives of major foreign companies.... Can we believe that all this was solely down to the stupidity of Russia's supreme leaders?... We cannot. This is not stupidity. This is a **crime**!

The Western World can be satisfied: The most powerful and dangerous opponent in World War III has been crushed and eliminated. Now the Russian electronics industry has to satisfy itself with the pitiful and humiliating role of assembling products from imported materials so that its specialists do not die of hunger. It has been "permitted" to make contacts with companies from Hong Kong, South Korea, and Indochina.... But China did not begrudge spending $10 billion on the purchase from the United States of the latest technology for the production of microprocessors, which are being used in the nuclear industry and in long-range missiles.... The departments which should be responsible for questions of Russia's national security are not sounding the alarm about this matter.... They are no doubt very busy: They have to guarantee B. Yeltsin's personal security, and here time is of the essence!

We cannot help but ask the question: **Is such a president possible** in the United States or any other developed country?... The answer is clear even to the most inveterate "democrat": No! Let us pose another question: **Could such a president be reelected**? The answer is clear: No!!! The immorality of what is happening in Russia should be obvious to any Russian arriving at the polling place 16 June!!!

International Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma Comments on Presidential Election in Russia

LD1906183396 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received] — The main thing is that the election in Russia proved to be valid, no matter what forecasts, Leonid Kuchma said, commenting on the outcome of the first round of the presidential election in the Russian Federation. "Ukraine has already made its forecast during the latest summit of the CIS heads of state, and we are not renouncing it," the Ukrainian president said. Kuchma expressed his wish that the reforms, currently under way in Russia, remain stable.

Ukraine: Kiev 18 Jun Press Reaction to Russian Elections

WS2006080896

[FBIS Report] Kiev newspapers on 18 June carry reports and commentaries following news on the incomplete results of the Russian presidential elections.

Kiev KYYIVSKA PRAVDA in Ukrainian on page 1 publishes an unattributed 100-word report titled "Russia Is at a Crossroads, While Lebed Higher Than the Clouds." The report calls Aleksandr Lebed's "upswing in popularity" with nearly 14 percent of the votes "the sensation" of the Russian presidential elections. Forecasting the second round between Boris Yeltsin and Gennadiy Zyuganov, the newspaper states that "the final victory will be won by the presidential candidate who will be able to turn Aleksandr Lebed to his side." The report concludes that "the destiny of Russia, whether you like it or not, will be resolved not by Yeltsin or Zyuganov, but by Lebed."

KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian, a widely read Kiev daily, publishes on pages 1 and 3 a 1,000-word report by Tetyana Sylyna and KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI Moscow correspondent Oleh Medvedev titled "Whom Will Lebed Take Under His Wing," in which the reporters and political analysts Oleh Soskin and Serhiy Odarych comment on the siuation. The reporters state that Aleksandr Lebed's is "a triumphant victor in the first round, because the outcome of the second round depends on him as on nobody else." The reporters quote Oleh Soskin, director of the Kiev Institute of Social Transformation, as saying that one-fourth of the Russian electorate "is simply weeping out of the desire to obtain a strong hand that could take up a whip and begin lashing their backs." Soskin is cited as saying that "a craving is awakening" among the Russian people "for a just and good but very severe tsar."

Another analyst quoted by KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, Serhiy Odarych, chairman of the "Ukrainian Perspective" fund, states: "A significant portion of Russian society wants to see a strong personality in the post of head of state. Lebed's figure, on one hand, personifies the national patriotic ideas hailed by Zhirinovskiy, while on the other, the general is a little bit more restrained than Vladimir Volfovich [Zhirinovskiy] and closer to the present-day Yeltsin. Most likely, the combination of these two qualities explains the phenomenon of this politician."

Continuing, the reporters assert that "hardly anybody in Moscow is doubting that Lebed will 'give' his votes to Yeltsin." They report that Lebed was offered the posts of secretary of the Presidential Security Council and defense minister, but declined both. They stress that Lebed "wants very much to take the helm of power on his own." Once given an important post, the reporters continue, "Lebed can quite soon 'dig up' compromising materials on anybody and use them in the presidential elections in the year 2000 or even earlier." They believe, however, that Yeltsin "will have to share power with Lebed, despite the fact that this partner is inconvenient for the current authority in all respects."

The reporters suggest that Lebed's possible support for any of the two candidates in the second round "will in no way mean that his electors will agree with the decision of their idol." This opinion is shared by Serhiy Odarych, who says: "It seems to me that a considerable part of Lebed's votes is anti-Yeltsin." As for Oleh Soskin, he predicts that Lebed may enter a bloc with Zyuganov.

Touching upon a possible outcome of the second round, the reporters forecast that "if Zyuganov gains the advantage, there will no second round at all." Serhiy Odarych believes that the second round may be "simply disrupted by a low turnout of voters," while Oleh Soskin predicts that some extraordinary events, like an attempt upon a candidate's life or the introduction of a state of emergency, may take place. Soskin suggests that the attempt upon the life of Zhirinovskiy's aide was "a rehearsal for such a situation."

Serhiy Odarych thinks that the election results will in no way affect the development of future relations between Ukraine and Russia. He says: "We should realize that there is virtually no political force in Russia inclined to consider Ukraine as an independent state."

Oleh Soskin believes that, following the elections, "Russia will be completely gripped by imperial spirit, and Ukraine will become a primary bridgehead for Russian expansion." Therefore, Soskin asserts, the election results will be negative for Ukraine in any case. Soskin sees a positive aspect in the fact that forces of the two candidates "for the monarch's throne" are approximately the same, and the struggle between them may last a long time. The report concludes with the opinion that Ukraine should take an advantage of the dissent in Russia and "escape into Europe as soon as possible."

Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian carries on page 1 a 300-word report by Hanna Loboda and Taras Burnos titled "Lebed's Pack." The reporters assert that the second round of the presidential election in Russia will be won by Yeltsin only if he is able to gain support from Lebed and Yavlinskiy. Lebed's alliance with Yeltsin, according to UKRAYINA MOLODA, is the most probable. The authors warn, however, that other "most improbable coalitions in the Russian establishment" also are possible.

VECHIRNIY KYYIV, a Kiev evening newspaper with a nationalist orientation, publishes on pages 1 and 2 an 800-word editorial by Chief Editor Vitaliy Karpenko titled "Russia's Choice." Karpenko states that "we in Ukraine should not be indifferent to who is going to rule in Moscow." And he continues: "Let there be anybody save for the communists. In the long run, this is not of great importance for Russia; the Russian communists are the same imperial chauvinists as Zhirinovskiy and his ilk, and this does not threaten Russia's independence. For Ukraine, this would be a considerable danger, because in such a case our home-bred neo-Bolsheviks would be substantially bolstered in their desire to put a Russian loop on our young independent state and drag it into a new empire."

After analyzing incomplete data on the voting results in Russia, Karpenko concludes that in the second round "Yeltsin's victory will be indubitable." In his opinion, three factors will influence the second round ballot in Yeltsin's favor: a) irrevocability of the democratic transformations in Russia and the disappointment of a considerable portion of society with communist ideals; b) Western support for Yeltsin, including multimillion dollar credits allotted by the United States; c) Russia's executive authorities and state media, which support Yeltsin and create an appropriate image for him. Karpenko adds that Yeltsin's character is "adventurous" and, in the event of an unexpected turnout, he may declare the second round of the presidential elections invalid.

Karpenko concludes by stating that "Ukraine should not pin special hopes on Mr. Yeltsin, let alone comrade Zyuganov." In his opinion, Yeltsin and Zyuganov "are similar like a pair of boots." He advises "taking advantage of internal conflicts in the political life of our northern neighbor in the interests of the Ukrainian state."

Ukraine: Kuchma, Kyrgyz Counterpart Support Democracy in Russia

LD1906175496 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1647 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, June 19 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukrainian and Kyrgyz Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Askar Akayev expressed support for democratic changes in Russia carried out by that country's government.

Akayev told journalists in Kiev Wednesday following the signing of bilateral documents that he is confident of Boris Yeltsin's electoral victory. "I support his reform course," he said and added that it is important for Kyrgyzstan who is Russia's president.

"The steps taken by the Russian president following the first round of voting give rise to the hope that he will win in the second round," Akayev said.

Kuchma stressed the importance of democratic elections in Russia and said that the very fact that these elections were held despite various forecasts is a great triumph of democracy.

The balance of forces after the first round "is essentially fair," he said.

Asked by Interfax-Ukraine to predict the results of the second round, Kuchma said that the presidents of CIS member nations had made their forecast known at the latest CIS summit.

"It would be better for Ukraine if Russia is steadily continuing on its present course," he said.

Ukraine: Kuchma, Kyrgyz Counterpart Sign Cooperation Treaty

LD1906175896 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1600 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received] — Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan signed a treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two countries. (The friendship and cooperation treaty, signed by the two countries in April 1991, had been in force until now.)

According to a UNIAN correspondent, the governments of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan today signed three agreements: on the development of economic cooperation, on industrial cooperation, and on cooperation in the field of certifying scientific and pedagogical personnel. Vasyl Yevtukhov, deputy prime minister for fuel and power engineering complex, signed the documents on behalf of Ukraine.

The two sides also signed intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in the fields of physical culture and sports; science and technologies; standardization, metrology, and certification; and an agreement on the principles of cooperation in the sphere of the production and delivery of aviation hardware.

The Ukrainian Education Ministry and the Kyrgyz Education and Science Ministry signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of education.

Ukraine: Moroz, Kyrgyz President Discuss Economic Relations

LD1906125596 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
0825 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz announced plans to call a conference of parliament members from European countries and the CIS to discuss the creation of nuclear-free zones. The speaker made the announcement at a meeting with visiting Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev. Akayev welcomed the proposal, saying that Kyrgyzstan would be glad to take part.

The Kyrgyz president said his main economic policy objective was to "restore ties" with the countries of the former Soviet Union. He expressed hope that Ukraine would join the list of his country's main trading partners, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz president called for the restoration of economic links, which had been mutually complementary for many years. Kyrgyzstan is primarily interested in Ukrainian agricultural produce in exchange for its nonferrous metals, electric equipment, and fuel.

The Kyrgyz president announced the opening of a Ukrainian studies department at the Slavonic University in Bishkek, to reflect the presence of a 90,000-strong Ukrainian community in the country. Overall, there are 1 million people of Slavonic origin in Kyrgyzstan, where Russian enjoys the status of second official language.

National Affairs

Ukraine: President May Be Asked To Hold Referendum on Constitution

LD1906182196 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1642 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, June 19 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Serhiy Teleshun, head of the domestic policy service of the presidential administration, does not exclude the possibility that in examining the draft new constitution, the "deputies will turn to the President with the request that the draft be submitted to referendum."

In the course of the briefing held at the administration on Wednesday, S.Teleshun noted that it would preferable if the Constitution be adopted by Verkhovna Rada. "This would make it possible to save budgetary funds, which is advocated by the MPs," he said.

Serhiy Teleshun observed, however, that in the draft Constitution prepared by the ad hoc committee and submitted to the session "there are three of four articles", which may cause differences among the deputies.

He named among them the draft article banning the deployment of foreign military bases in Ukraine's territory, articles concerning the status of Crimea, its official language, symbols and property, which were included in the latest examination of the draft.

The i's have not yet been dotted on the issue on the deployment of foreign bases in Ukraine's territory, Teleshun said, and recalled that at the meeting of ad hoc committee none of its members declared against its adoption. In so doing, he underscored "the leftists voted for it, bearing in mind Ukraine's possible contacts with NATO, and the rightists — with the CIS military-political bloc."

Ukraine: Disaffected Military Target Defense Minister, President

MM1906133696 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Grigoriy Nesmyanovich: "National Institute for Strategic Research Has Conducted Poll Among 1,003 Ukrainian Officers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Not long before the results of this poll were published, Major General Vilen Martirosyan, chairman of the Committee for Questions of the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families, admitted that during the past year, even according to the understated assessments of the Ministry of Defense, military property intended for various purposes and worth around 581 billion karbovantsi was sold. A great many people, including Martirosyan, are now blaming the minister of defense for the precipitate commercialization of the Army. And they are blaming not only him. During the poll conducted by the National Institute for Strategic Research, every second officer defined his attitude toward the supreme commander in chief (the president) as "negative," and one in three as "completely negative." The minister of defense found himself even lower on this scale of ratings....

Recently, Valeriy Shmarov has been increasingly accused of not wanting to accommodate officers and generals who see the state of affairs in the Army differently. The dismissal of a number of generals, including the chief of the General Staff, is eloquent enough testimony to this.

More than half of those polled believe that the Army cannot carry out its main function today — defending the country. At heart, so to speak, over one-third of officers are in favor of the integration of the Slavic states of the CIS. They are not ruling out the possibility of the creation of a military bloc among Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Almost 70 percent of those polled are dissatisfied with service, and one-third of them are prepared to leave it right now. Nor has order No. 20 of the minister of defense, in accordance with which an officer can be discharged without any guarantee that he will be given housing, improved the atmosphere in the military units. Furthermore, there are 72,000 officers in the Army today without apartments, and another 30,000 officers in the reserve who are also awaiting their turn.

Ukraine: Official Says Ban on Foreign Military Bases Premature

LD1906115996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1117 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, June 19 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukrainian National Security Council Secretary Vladimir Gorbulin has described as premature the inclusion in the draft constitution of provisions banning foreign military bases in Ukraine.

"Mistakes are being made under the guise of calls for the protection of independence," Gorbulin told journalists on Wednesday.

At the same time, he believes that the question "has every right to exist," adding however that "with the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, we have driven ourselves into a corner by such provisions."

Gorbulin stressed that the adoption of such provisions may complicate the resolution of the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet. He urged lawmakers to "assess the real circumstances" during the drafting of the constitution.

Belarus

Belarus: Tsepkala's Comments on Missile Withdrawal

WS1906122896 Minsk SVABODA in Belarusian 18 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Valeryy Tsepkala by Ales Dashchynski; place and date not given: "After We Remove Missiles Out of the Country Today, We Will Never Bring Them Back"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fate of 18 Russian nuclear missiles, which are still located on Belarusian territory, depends most of all on the outcome of the presidential election in Russia. President Lukashenka is delaying the missiles' withdrawal from our territory, thus violating the previously signed accords. The SVABODA correspondent asked Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Valeryy Tsepkala to explain the situation.

[Dashchynski] Is Belarus interested in withdrawing the missiles from its territory as soon as possible?

[Tsepkala] After we remove the missiles out of the country today, we will never bring them back. When this happens, one will be able to say that we have put this behind us, and that an initiative will now be implemented to create a nuclear-free zone spreading from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. After that, it will be impossible to redeploy the missiles, even if the balance of forces or the geopolitical, political, and security situation should change.

Who could have thought that the Czechs and Poles would deploy NATO weapons on their territories? Three years ago, when Soviet nuclear arms were removed from these countries, no one could have considered that possility.

[Dashchynski] Does this mean that the Russian "Topol" missiles will be an argument against the eastward expansion of NATO?

[Tsepkala] Generally speaking, I believe that NATO expansion would put this organization in crisis. It would change the balance of forces throughout the world. And not only because NATO would move close to our borders, but also because security policy would be built on a different basis — it would be based on the balance of forces and the appearance of traditional state alliances. This is why the missiles issue is certainly an argument, but it is definitely a short-term one [sentence as published].

[Dashchynski] Do you think that the Russian side is interested in the quickest possible withdrawal of missiles from our territory? The daily IZVESTIYA, for example, wrote that Moscow supports the removal of its missiles, while President Lukashenka oppposes it.

[Tsepkala] I do not understand why Russia would be interested in this [the speedy removal of its missiles]. Russia would want to have its missiles withdrawn faster only if they had technical defects. Let Russia decide on its own. The former Belarusian Supreme Soviet chairman and prime minister said that the missiles should be withdrawn by the end of 1996. However, the realistic written schedule envisions that they will be withdrawn by the end of 1997. Our minister did not receive any note on the nuclear missile withdrawal from Russian Foreign Minister Primakov. Such a note could have been sent through other channels.

Belarus: Lukashenka 'Sympathies' With Russian Communists Noted

MM1906151296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Belarusian Testing Range"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 17 June, addressing the leaders of official youth organizations, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka gave a unique assessment of the results of the first round of the presidential elections in Russia. In his opinion the Russian people will not accept the reforms to which they have been subjected in recent years and so the majority of voters voted against the present authorities.

These statements by what would seem to be Boris Yeltsin's closest ally in Russian-Belarusian integration in actual fact contain nothing surprising. Belarus has never been renowned for special adherence to reforms and since Lukashenka's election the decline of the new economic policy has begun in earnest. The sympathies of the head of the sovereign state are on the side of the Communists, who are socially close to him, and the management methods which they preach and which its leader is constantly implementing in Belarus.

Belarus: Official: REUTER Distorts Lukashenka on Russian Elections

WS2006090396 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Commenting for INTERFAX on the REUTER report aired in the "Time" program on 18 June to the effect that Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka had allegedly assessed the results of the Russian elections almost as a voters' protest against the policy being conducted by the current president of the Russian Federation, Uladzimir Zamyatalin, deputy chief of the Belarusian Presidential Administration, termed the report an outrageous violation of human rights. Journalists who call themselves independent, and who did not attend Alyaksandr Lukashenka's meeting with young people, again grossly distorted the Belarusian president's statement on the first round of the Russian elections.

Uladzimir Zamyatalin emphasized that Alyaksandr Lukashenka said that the results of the elections indicate that the voters view with equivocation the reforms and changes which have been conducted in Russia. Belarus, which also selected the path of democratic reforms, will take into account the mistakes committed in the friendly state while implementing these reforms. Alyaksandr Lukashenka emphasized that Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, with whom he has established a strong friendship, understands the errors committed during the reforms, and has seriously changed the process of Russia's further economic development in order to correct these mistakes.

Belarus: EU Warns Against Nationalization of Commercial Banks

WS2006103196 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The EU recommends the Belarusian leadership avoid the nationalization of commercial banks, a source from the Republic's government has informed the Financial Information Agency. According to a special EU report which was handed over to our government in mid-June, following a nationalization, the banking problem of inefficient assessment of their own resources may deteriorate, because most often state banks service [industrial branches Moreover, financing just one sector of the economy does not make it possible for them to form an optimum loan portfolio, because loans are granted to both stable and loss-making companies.

Belarus: Memorandum on Cooperation Signed With S. Korea's Daewoo

WS2006114496 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A delegation of South Korea's Daewoo corporation is currently visiting Belarus. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka yesterday met with the representatives of this corporation. Our correspondent Svyatlana Ilyushenka has the details:

[Ilyushenka] This well know corporation has currently 200 branches all over the world, and the foreign businessmen are going to expand the geography of their presence. For our state, such cooperation is also very advantageous. The Belarusian government and the South Korean corporation Daewoo have signed a memorandum on the development of cooperation. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka outlined the primary directions of this cooperation during the meeting with the delegation members.

[Begin Lukashenka recording in Russian] It would not be bad if we add our Integral plant to this program and your [passage indistinct]. Therefore, what you have proposed for cooperation with Belarus is the first step, and what I have proposed — a more active program — will become the second and third steps of our cooperation. I guarantee normal functioning of your capital, and I also guarantee its protection and security. So first of all, I would like to suggest you send basic groups responsible for primary directions of our agreement in order that they conduct talks with our government and ministries, and indirectly with our enterprises. [end recording] [passage omitted including Daewoo president's comments]

Moldova

Moldova: Chisinau Experts Satisfied With Talks on Dniester Status

AU1906180796 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1730 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, June 19 (INFOTAG). The Chisinau expert team leader, First Deputy Minister of Justice Mihai Busuleac has expressed appreciation of the results achieved at the last Monday's [17 June] summit meeting with Tiraspol leaders. In his interview with INFOTAG, Busuleac has emphasized the particular importance of the compromise reached on the draft Memorandum on the principles of the Dniester settlement. "The draft has been coordinated. In the near future it will be submitted to the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], Russian and Ukrainian Presidents, who are supposed to sign it as well. We presume, the document will also be signed by the representatives of all Moldovan and Dniester power branches. It cannot be ruled out that the Memorandum will be signed even before the next summit of July 24", Busuleac said.

He stressed that after long debates, the sides have achieved a key compromise which envisages that the state-legal relations between the two parts of Moldova will be developing in the framework of a single state, within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Moldova.

According to the draft Memorandum, "Dniester is a state-territorial unit in the form of republic in the framework of the Republic of Moldova", and a respective document which will define the status of Dniester "shall be based on reciprocal guarantees and reciprocal delegating of plenary powers".

"These Memorandum provisions do not signify any federalization of the Republic of Moldova. They envisage a high degree of autonomy", Busuleac said. The Memorandum is kind of a protocol of intentions, and the two expert teams will yet have to work hard to draft a status document proper. Upon signing, the Memorandum is supposed to boost the status drafting progress.

The Deputy Minister particularly stressed that the compromise had been reached before the results of the Russian presidential elections had been officially announced, which stands testimony to the sides' serious intentions to finally resolve the Dniester problem. In his opinion, both Chisinau and Tiraspol are demonstrating a very responsible approach to the Memorandum, and revision of stance by either of them would be inadmissible.

Moldova: Special Status for Dniester Region Should Be Guaranteed

LD1806151196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1449 GMT 18 Jun 96

[By Valeriy Agarkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 18 (Itar-Tass) — The memorandum on the basic principles of relations between Moldova and the Dniester region takes into account in full measure the main aspects regarding the problem of the Dniester settlement. It recognises Russia's role in working out the special status of the Dniester region and in guaranteeing of its observance.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin, at a briefing in the Russian Foreign Ministry today, assessed in this way the draft final document coordinated by the parties to the talks in Chisinau yesterday.

Karasin said that as a result of prolonged debates, the supreme leadership of the sides, at a meeting held with active participation of mediators from Russia and OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], arrived at a compromise wordings of key articles of the memorandum that had earlier prompted acute debate.

Moldova: Zyuganov Reportedly Suits Tiraspol Better Than Yeltsin

AU1906145996 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 18 Jun 96 p 11

[Report by Anatoliy Marchenko: "Will an Accord Ripen Soon?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leaderships of Moldova and the Dniester Moldovan Republic held yet another round of talks in Chisinau yesterday during which they discussed, among other documents, certain paragraphs of the memorandum on the main principles of settlement of the conflict in the Dniester Region.

The parties were to have signed that document in May, but all of its provisions have not yet been coordinated. Nevertheless, the memorandum is likely to be signed in the near future, thus opening the way for a concrete resolution to the problem concerning the status of the Dniester Region. The sides will really have to sweat over this. "I do not think the Dniester leaders will make concessions on all points, but I believe our negotiations will soon lead us to a common denominator," Moldovan President Mircea Snegur assessed.

The results of the presidential elections in Russia will undoubtedly influence the course of the negotiations. It is no secret that Gennadiy Zyuganov at the "Kremlin throne" would suit Tiraspol better. In that case, even greater support for the self-proclaimed republic might be expected to the extent that it could be unconditionally recognized. However, Boris Yeltsin's victory is becoming increasingly imminent, and in all likelihood Dniester residents will have what they have now: They will be compelled to reach an agreement with Chisinau.

Yevhen Levytskyy, Ukrainian presidential representative in the settlement of the Dniester conflict, also participated in yesterday's talks. In addition, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko recently made another visit to Tiraspol. Thus the negotiating process between Chisinau and Tiraspol is intensifying along with the intensification of Ukraine's mediation efforts.

Moldova: Dniester Parliament Head Hails Lebed's Appointment

AU1906183496 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1730 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tiraspol, June 19 (INFOTAG) — The Dniester Parliament chairman, Grigore Marakuta, has welcomed the appointment of Lt.Gen. Alexander Lebed, ex-Commander of the former Russian 14th Army, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and Presidential Aide for national security issues.

Despite the memorable principal differences between Lebed and the separatist authorities, who were incessantly and severely criticized by the General, Marakuta nonetheless stated that the new appointment "will promote the Dniester conflict settlement".

"The new Security Council Secretary will help establish order not only in Russia, but in all former Soviet republics", Marakuta remarked.

"His appointment was not a surprise for Tiraspol. This, as well as the resignation of Defense Minister Grachev, are parts of Yeltsin's electoral strategy. We wish all success to Alexander Lebed who, in due time, contributed greatly to establishing peace in Dniester. As for the differences between him and us, I believe personal ambitions must yield to state interests", Marakuta said.

Moldova: PFD: Russia Not 'Valuable Example' for Electoral Campaign

AU1906174696 Chisinau INFOTAG in English
2025 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, June 18 (INFOTAG) — The chairman of the Party of Democratic Forces [PFD], Valeriu Matei, has stated that law-enforcement bodies undertake no measures to investigate the authorities' abuses of power.

For an example, he referred to data presented in the report of the State Calculation Chamber which was heard by the Parliament last week. The report stressed that last year the State Budget short-received 300 million lei, or 25 percent of planned revenues. Credits worth 58 million lei had been issued against security of the Government, and they have not been repaid. The Chamber filed in 16 cases with the General Prosecutor's Office, but not a single investigation has been brought to a logical end. "In 1995, the Government inflicted a tremendous damage to the population. This team is a bright specimen of incompetence, particularly with regard to budget drafting. Under some budget sections, revenues accounted for 119 percent, under other ones — 0.2 percent", Matei stressed.

The PFD believes that the formation of a left-wing bloc, which was stated on Monday, should prompt the right-wing forces to set up a similar bloc in order to elect a really democratic president, stated a PFD leader MP Alexandru Mosanu at the press conference today. "The would-be left bloc is no surprise for us. And we will be not surprised if that bloc is eventually joined by some elements from the ruling Agrarian Democratic Party, who many times stated that their Program is more communist than that of the Communist Party. All this is a threat to democracy, and should stimulate the democratic right forces to get united", Mosanu emphasized.

PFD Chairman Valeriu Matei has reminded that the party congress to be held next Sunday will discuss the candidate nomination issue, and the PFD is open for cooperation with other parties, provided their programs are in no contradiction with the PFD principles and goals.

"We take into consideration other countries' electoral experience, but we cannot say that Russia is a valuable example for us in running an election campaign", Valeriu Matei confessed.

"Our two countries have much in common, but we also have considerable differences. Like in Russia, Moldova has many parties nostalgic about the past, and has parties that were formed on somebody's command. They speak about a democracy, but use old methods of work. That is why we need to participate in the elections, in order to bring our message to the electorate, demonstrate our alternatives, and try to win the people's sympathy", stated Vasile Nedelciuc, one more PFD celebrity.

In his opinion, the above-stated differences are that the two nations are pursuing two different goals in external policy: Moldova is busy consolidating its independence, while Russia is seeking to get consolidated at the international arena as a leading political and nuclear power.

Matei presumes, Moldova should not cherish great hopes for any positive changes after the Russian presidential elections. Till now, Yeltsin used to render moral, material and financial support to Tiraspol separatists. In case communists win in Russia, this support will only strengthen.

Moldova: Smirnov Decides Not To Run for Presidency

AU1906184296 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English
1830 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tiraspol, 19.06.1996 (BASA-press) Dniester leader Igor Smirnov told reporters after the June 17 meeting with Chisinau leaders that he would not put up his candidacy for the autumn presidential polls in Moldova.

Asked by BASA whether he was considering running for Moldovan presidential office, Tiraspol Parliament Speaker Grigori Marakuta said he did not give it much thinking.

Touching upon Chisinau-Tiraspol talks, Marakuta said Dniester obtained the status of "state-territorial formation in the form of republic within Moldova's common borders, acknowledged worldwide," saying "the sides will reciprocally review their powers, having the mutual consent."

"If we decide to keep everything we have, or even to add something it will be that way, and not the other way round," said Marakuta.

Armenia

Armenia: Prime Minister Leaves for Economic Meeting in Switzerland

NC1906173996 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation headed by Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan left for Switzerland today to attend the (Gransmontana) conference which will discuss matters relating to the enrollment of the countries in transition in the formation of new markets. The prime minister will deliver a report on the efforts under way in Armenia for the creation of market relations.

Within the context of the conference, the Armenian delegation will also meet the leadership of Swiss Government and of the World Trade Organization, and will hold contacts with the officials of the countries participating in the congress and with the representatives of business circles on issues of interest for Armenia.

Armenia: More on President's Congress Remarks on Nagorno-Karabakh

MM2006114796 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Boris Mkrtchyan: "Nagorno-Karabakh Threatened by Genocide"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yerevan — Armenian President Levon Ter- Petrosyan, speaking at a congress of the ruling Armenian Pannational Movement party, has stated that the international community is deluding itself if it identifies the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with the conflicts which have taken place in Chechnya, Abkhazia, the Dniester Region, or Ossetia. The terrible thing about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian president believes, is that the people of that self-determining republic are really threatened by genocide, whereas the states on whose territories there are other conflicts are capable of guaranteeing the physical existence of their peoples.

Nagorno-Karabakh's self-determination and its secession from Azerbaijan came about by means of a nationwide referendum and on the basis of the very article of the former USSR Constitution which Azerbaijan itself had used to secede from the USSR and to gain self-determination. But Azerbaijan's response to the first Nagorno-Karabakh attempt to achieve independence took the shape of pogroms and mass murders of civilians in Sumgait, Baku, and Ganja.

"The principle of states' territorial integrity should not mean that one people dominates another. It can be replaced by the peoples' right to free self-determination. It is only on the basis of this international right that the Nagorno-Karabakh problem should be resolved and security guarantees should be provided for Nagorno-Karabakh. But Azerbaijan will not accept this, however much the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations may try to persuade it," the Armenian president stated.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Foreign Ministry Statement Condemns 'Amendment of Porter'

NC1906135896 Baku TURAN in English 1131 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU/18.06.96/TURAN: Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan issued a statement today in which condemned a statement by the Foreign Ministry of Armenia of June 15 with ungrounded critic of the position of the U.S. Administration regarding so-called amendment of Porter.

Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry considers that the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia runs counter with the statement by Yerevan of identifying the status of Nagorno-Karabakh within the frameworks of the OSCE Minsk Group.

Adoption of Porter's amendment, the statement reads, will create a dangerous pretendent which will aggravate the resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. The statement notes that The Armenian Assembly of America made a similar statement on June 13. Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan draws attention on coordinated actions of the Armenian diaspora and official Yerevan. Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan notes that Yerevan, separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. did not like high level of relations between America and Azerbaijan. In this respect the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan made a protest. Statement of the Foreign Ministry of Armenia of June 15, 1996 was assessed as running counter the norms of the international law which is brutal interference to home affairs of Azerbaijan and bilateral American-Azeri relations. Official Baku expressed a hope that Congress and Administration of the U.S. will find and take a decision which will meet national interests of both countries.

Azerbaijan: Iranian, Azerbaijani Health Ministers Hold Meeting

NC2006053496 Baku TURAN in English 1551 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku /19.06.96/ TURAN — Yesterday there was the meeting between Ministers of Health of Iran and Azerbaijan, 'Ali Reza Marandi and

Ali Insanov. Besides common issues related to medicine in both states, the issue on continuation of cooperation in field of heath and medical education has been discussed. Each of the sides has stressed its readiness to continue cooperation in these fields.

Azerbaijan's Minister of Health, Ali Insanov, said he hopes Iran will continue cooperation with Azerbaijan and exchange of experience in field of prophylactics of epidemic diseases.

During two-hour meeting the necessity of expanding of regional cooperation has been stressed. In particular, they spoke about construction of plant for production of medicines as well as iodine salt and antidotes. The sides stand for development of cooperation between the representatives of Ministers of Health in border regions of Iran and Azerbaijan, the Embassy of Iran in Baku reported.

Today Iran's Minister of Health is expected to be received by President Aliyev.

Georgia

Georgia: Shevardnadze Denies Defense Minister's Role in Moscow Plot

LD1906172096 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1702 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, June 19 (Interfax) — Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze considers as "a misunderstanding" the accusations against Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze of his involvement in an alleged military plot in Moscow.

Such accusations against Nadibaidze were put forward by Russian Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed.

"I do not think that Nadibaidze could perform a coup in such a country as Russia," Shevardnadze told reporters in Tbilisi on Wednesday.

The Georgian defense minister visited Moscow in order to carry out the Georgian leadership's decisions concerning military-and-technological cooperation between the two countries, Shevardnadze said.

"It is unworthy to elaborate on Nadibaidze's involvement in some plot," Shevardnadze said.

Georgia: Defense Minister on Relations With Russia, Moscow Visit

LD1906155296 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian
1355 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 19 Jun (IPRINDA) — An Iprinda correspondent has been told at the news center of the Georgian Defense Ministry that Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze has categorically denied the television statement by Aleksandr Lebed, the secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, and has refrained from comment on the motives for the unsubstantiated accusations against him. Nadibaidze said that the aim of an eight-day visit to Moscow by the Georgian Defense Ministry delegation was to hold talks on military cooperation rather than show any kind of support for the leader of any establishment of the neighbouring country.

As regards the presidential elections in Russia, Nadibaidze welcomed the will of the Russian people, who had supported the policy of democratic change by voting for Yeltsin.

Nadibaidze described his visit to Moscow as productive and said that a very useful treaty had been signed with the Russian side providing for a stage-by-stage upgrading of the Georgian air defense system and financial aid worth 10 billion rubles. He said that expensive command post equipment had already been delivered to Georgia.

Georgia: Abkhaz Prosecutor Issues Arrest Warrant for Chechen Leader

LD1906163296 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1400 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to information from the [pro- Georgian] Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the Abkhazia prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for Shamil Basayev on 19 June.

Shamil Basayev is accused of setting up an antistate military organization — the Armed Forces of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples — in Gudauta [in Abkhazia] in August 1992. Most members of the organization were citizens of a foreign country. The organization, led by Shamil Basayev, was engaged in active combat operations against the Armed Forces of Georgia, which resulted in the occupation of part of Georgian territory — namely, Gagra and the Gagra region [in Abkhazia] — and the death of 500 people of various nationalities.

Apart from that, Shamil Basayev is accused of organizing bandit attacks, mass murders, the deliberate killing of peaceful civilians, and other crimes.

A search has been instituted for Shamil Basayev, and the appropriate authorities of the Russian Federation will be informed of this with a request to take the necessary measures.

Georgia: Authorities 'Will Not Back Down' Over Trial of Abkhazians

LD2006113796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1104 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, June 20 (Interfax) — Officials from Georgia's Supreme Court have said that the Georgian authorities will not back down over the trial of two Abkhazians, the Pachulia brothers.

"The Georgian authorities will not react to any ultimatum demands of Abkhaz fighters, and the trial of the Pachulia brothers accused of genocide against the Georgian population in Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 conflict will obligatorily take place," the officials told Interfax Thursday.

Meanwhile the trial, which was to be started on June 19 in the city of Zugdidi in western Georgia, has been postponed for some days, representatives of the Zugdidi administration told Interfax.

"The postponement was caused by an ultimatum put forward by Abkhaz fighters who seized 21 passengers on an intercity bus headed from Gali to Zugdidi. Threatening to shoot the hostages, the fighters called for the Pachulia brothers to be freed," representatives of the administration said.

The press center of Abkhazia's Supreme Soviet, temporarily functioning in Tbilisi, told Interfax that reports of the liberation of several hostages and of changes in the fighters' demands are incorrect.

"The shooting of hostages will be the beginning of hostilities between Georgia and Abkhazia's separatist regime," leader of the press center Shota Bichikashvili said.

Meanwhile, Abkhazia's authorities refute Tbilisi's statements on the seizure of hostages.

Abkhazia's plenipotentiary representative in Moscow Igor Akhba told Interfax that employees of the Gali regional interior department detained nine Georgian fighters with arms near the village of Verkhnee Bargebi. A bus with Georgian licence plates was stopped almost simultaneously near the village. There were eight men without documents in the bus. It is not ruled out that they are connected with fighters, and an investigation is under way, Akhba said.

The Abkhaz party has not set forth any ultimatums, in particular, about the liberation of the Pachulia brothers, Akhba said. He recalled that the brothers were seized by Georgian fighters on Abkhaz territory and transported to Georgia's Zugdidi region.

Georgia: Article Assesses Potential of New Caspian Oil Field

AU1906144596 Tbilisi REZONANSI in Georgian 13 Jun 96 pp 1, 6

[Report by Rati Garsevanishvili: "The Oil Pipeline in Georgia Will Be Expanding"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A third oil contract has been signed with foreign companies in Azerbaijan. The agreement signifies the exploitation of the promising "Shah-Deniz" field. Britain's "British Petroleum" and Norway's "Statoil" have the largest controlling interest — 51 percent — in the new consortium. The German [as published] oil company "Elf Aquitaine" figures for the first time in the list of shareholders in the Azerbaijani consortium with 10 percent. Russia's "Lukoil" has to be satisfied again with 10 percent. Iran's "Oiek" [name as transliterated] has the same share.

According to assessments made by specialists, the "Shah-Deniz" field contains 250 million tonnes of oil, 400 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and 200 million tonnes of gas condensate. The oil reserves in the "Shah-Deniz" field are approximately half of those in the three fields that figure in the "contract of the century." As regards natural gas, "Shah-Deniz" clearly has a bigger amount than the "contract of the century."

Tim Eggar, Britain's trade and industry minister, emphasized that three Caspian states were participating in the consortium. This is no chance observation. Moscow and Tehran, the main opponents to the "contract of the century," state that the Caspian Sea is an internal water store and therefore its resources should be exploited jointly. Proceeding from this, they consider the consortiums that have been formed as illegal. However, Russia and Iran are being forced to adapt to reality. Baku is helping them in this by giving them a profitable share, although the controlling share, as a rule, remains in the hands of western oil companies.

The contract that has been concluded means that exploration work will be carried out over a three-year period. It is significant that in this case, Azerbaijan will make a profit even if no oil is found in the "Shah-Deniz" field. This was not stipulated in the previous contracts. In addition, the extracted gas will be supplied to Azerbaijan free of charge. As Natik Aliyev, president of the Azerbaijan State Oil Company, pointed out, there has been a fall in the extraction of gas. The exploitation of the "Shah-Deniz" field should resolve this problem.

The three consortiums that have been created will soon be supplemented by others. Agreements in connection with the "Lenkoran-Deniz" and "Talish-Deniz" fields are already ready to be signed. Their oil reserves are estimated at 140 million tonnes. Specialists maintain that there are more than 100 oil fields in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian shelf alone and this when only three were under discussion in the "contract of the century." If we take into account the oil reserves of other states in the Caspian shelf, which amount to far more than Azerbaijan's, it becomes clear that one route cannot suffice to transport these sources of energy. Furthermore, the question of transporting gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Europe and the Near East has already become topical. Specialists maintain that this gigantic flow of energy sources cannot be accommodated along one route alone. It is Georgia that figures most frequently as a transit country in oil and gas projects.

Estonia

Estonia: 'Confidential' Material in Distributed Official Publication

WS2006091996 Tallinn ETA in English
1016 GMT 20 Jun 96

[From 20 June POSTIMEES, p1; "News Bulletin" No.119/96]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Thursday, June 20 — The publication "Current situation and development problems of Estonia", edited by the prime minister's office, contains confidential information on defence forces and counter-intelligence activities.

The book was distributed among MPs and ministers as well as journalists last week and contains no announcements that the materials may be confidential or secret. The article on the defence forces, however, reveals developments plans including the forming of 9 infantry battalions, a signal battalion, an electronic intelligence battalion and a logistics battalion. The article continues to describe the organisation of Defence League units into 18 reserve and 20 territorial battalions and reveals the amount of small arms and ammunition to be purchased. Ants Laaneots, advisor to Regular Armed Forces commander, explained that these data are confidential but refused to comment on the prime minister's bureau activities. The government has declared mobilisation plans and plans for emergencies a state secret, but some military experts claim that the publication reveals these data.

Another article reveals the priorities of the Security Police as gathering information on the current posts, ties and possible anti-Estonian activities of former KGB officials, on the espionage activities of foreign embassy personnel, including the Russian Embassy, and on the anti-Estonian activities of the pro-Moscow Orthodox Church. Estonian authorities have so far denied any state institutions involvement in the conflict between the two churches. The article further announced that the Security Police has connected enough information to expel a foreign diplomat from Estonia. POSTIMEES presumes that the sentence referred to the Russian diplomat Sergey Andreyev, allegedly linked to Russian military intelligence, who has already left the country. The purchase and development of secure communications equipment was listed as another priority task.

Security Police chief Juri Pihl commented that they would not have published so detailed information and explained that the Security Police has not compiled the corresponding chapter in the book. All Security Police reports are marked as containing confidential information, Pihl added. The Security Police has to find out now, how did the information reach the publication, he said.

Government spokeswoman Marika Saarna-Siimann explained that the necessary articles had been compiled by the corresponding ministries and departments and their contents had been approved by a number of officials, including the prime minister. Prime minister's advisor Heido Vitsur added that the ministries had decided on the information to be included in the book. The government had made it clear that the book was intended to be for general public access, Vitsur stressed.

Estonia: Background Details of 'Ruble Deal' Case Reported

MM1906103696 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Nikolay Lashkevich: "Rubles Sold Too Cheap in Scam. Seems That Culprits Are Being Condemned for This"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vilnius — The trial is taking place in Tallinn of three people implicated in the notorious "ruble deal" involving the sale of Russian rubles in cash which had been collected during the monetary reform in Estonia in the summer of 1992.

Contrary to expectations, in the dock were not former Prime Minister Mart Laar and present Foreign Minister Siim Kallas, former Bank of Estonia director, who had given their blessing to the deal by signing a directive on the sale of the rubles in cash, but those who had carried out the senior leadership's order.

I must remind you that a little over 2 billion Russian rubles collected in 1992 from the republic's inhabitants were sold the following winter to Russia through a company that was registered in Finland, though it belonged to Estonians who were mixed up in the deal. The rubles were sold even though an agreement existed between Russia and Estonia on the surrender to the Central Bank of Russia of the entire sum withdrawn from circulation. Russia never received the money which vanished as if it had never existed.

Estonia earned $1.9 million from the deal. However, the interesting thing is that the state control organs, on whose initiative the "ruble trial" is being held, filed a claim against those involved in the deal not because the sale had taken place, but because...the return from it had been too low, as a result of which the state control representatives think that Estonia received $2-3 million too little. In short the money had been sold at too low a price....

The rubles were taken out of Estonia through Tallinn airport in late 1992 and early 1993 in four consignments.

We have it on good authority that they were loaded into aircraft that had arrived from Latvia and Chechnya. What happened to them after that is not known but the Chechen link is certain. It is assumed that gunmen were busy obtaining arms in 1993 using the Russian rubles of Estonian origin.

As yet the court has not presented its findings on the main questions arising from an examination of the "ruble case": Who really received the money and for what purposes was it used; where and in whose account did it end up; and who among Estonia's most senior officials gained from this strange deal? As for the demands to compensate Russia for its losses at the exchange rate of the time (around $18 million), Estonia is hardly likely to heed them. When the IMF rules are quoted, which state that money which is exchanged must be returned without question, they come up with their own arguments: Repay the several tens of millions of dollars belonging to the inhabitants of Estonia which have been frozen in Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity]. What is more the Estonian authorities are ready at any moment to present Russia with another bill and demand compensation for, among other things, the "losses incurred by Estonia during the years of Soviet occupation." However, the subject of mutual indebtedness does not nevertheless conceal the underlying criminal intent of the "ruble deal," and Estonia will in any case have to give Russia a reasoned response about what it has done with the currency.

Latvia

Latvia: Ulmanis Sees Improved Russia Ties, Wants 'Full-Scale' Talks

MM2006113396 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 96 p 3

[Repoort by Nikolay Lashkevich: "Latvia Has New Old President"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Fifty-three. This would appear to be Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis' lucky number. This was the number of votes cast in the Seimas for his candidacy in the first presidential elections. It was the same number of deputies who voted for him in the new elections held in the Latvian parliament last Tuesday (see IZVESTIYA No. 112). [passage omitted]

Immediately after the voting procedure ended G. Ulmanis gave a press conference, at which he stated that he will pursue a course of continuity in foreign policy geared, in particular, toward the integration of the Baltic countries, entry into NATO, and the mainmtenance of good-neighborly relations with Russia.

Replying to a question from IZVESTIYA's correspondent on the prospects for the development of Latvian-Russian relations, G. Ulmanis stated that during his new term as president these relations should undergo substantive changes — for the better, of course. However, the Latvian president preferred not to speak about specific paths and options for developing bilateral relations on a new basis, referring to the need for a separate conversation on this topic. According to G. Ulmanis, full-scale bilateral talks should be held after the presidential elections in Russia.

Immediately after such successful elections the new-old Latvian president plans to depart for his favorite spots in Kurmeni and

Zemgale. One of his dearest wishes is simply to sit on a river bank and think in peace and quiet.

Latvia: Ruling Factions To Sign Coalition Agreement

WS1906143896 Tallinn BNS in English 1313 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jun 19, BNS — The Latvian government-forming factions plan to sign a coalition agreement, deputy Maris Vitols of the Farmers Union and the Christian Democrat Union's coalition faction told BNS.

Support for the necessity of such agreement was voiced during the Factions Cooperation Council meeting on Wednesday [19 June] by representatives of all but the Latvian Unity Party faction whose representative was not present at the meeting.

Signing of a coalition agreement was proposed by Prime Minister Andris Skele.

A working group has been set up for the agreement drafting.

The government-forming factions are currently cooperating under an agreement, but not a strict coalition accord.

Vitols said that the coalition agreement will be signed to politically consolidate the ruling factions, because the political tention has weakened after the presidential elections.

The agreement will also be aimed at resolving the voting discipline problems among the deputies of the government factions.

The coalition agreement will be possibly signed for the term of one year, and define form 10 to 12 main tasks of the government.

The coalition agreement will have to be signed by all deputies of the government-forming factions. Vitols noted that, due to this reason, the number of deputies who support the government could decrease.

Lithuania

Lithuania: Ukrainian President Backs Deeper Cooperation With Baltics

LD1906174896 Moscow Interfax in English 1642 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VILNIUS, June 19 (Interfax) — Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in a letter to Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas supported deeper cooperation between Ukraine and the Baltics, sources in the office of the Lithuanian president told Interfax Wednesday.

"This course entirely meets the interests of each state and the region as a whole," Kuchma said of closer relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. His letter followed a summit of Baltic presidents held on May 28-29 in Vilnius.

The single position of presidents of three Baltic states concerning support of democratic and economic reforms in Ukraine, understanding of Ukraine's role as an important component in forming stability and security system on the European continent aroused the special interest of the Ukrainian president, the letter says.

Development of friendly relations between Ukraine and Baltic states has good prospects, Kuchma said.

Heads of the Baltic states during their summit in Vilnius fixed principles for deepening cooperation and interaction with three neighboring states during integration into the European Union, NATO and other European structures.

Lithuania: Politician on Relations With Russia, Council of Europe

LD1906123996 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Lithuania quite often is unable to present itself as a state with clear and firm stance in its relations with Russia, Alirdas Gricius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Seimas foreign affairs committee and head of the Lithuanian parliamentary delegation at the Council of Europe, told a news conference held in the Seimas today.

Having described the Russo-Lithuanian relationship as moderate and normal, Algirdas Gricius noted that there has been a lack of more vigorous activity on the part of Lithuania with regard to the issues of the return of embassy buildings [in Paris and Rome currently occupied by Russia], the repayment of people's deposits at the Russian Vneshekonombank, and the issue of the delineation of the state border with Russia.

Mr. Gricius recalled that for two years Russian citizens have paid $5 for a visa to Lithuania, whereas the Russian visa costs $20 to $25. Only recently the fees for visas have been made more or less the same, he said.

The head of the Lithuanian parliamentary delegation at the Council of Europe is prepared to sharply raise the issue of the return of the embassy buildings and other issues at the Council's September session. By this time Russia will have been a member of the Council of Europe for six months and it will be high time Russia is reminded of its obligations to the Council of Europe.

Speaking about the 24-25 June session of the Council of Europe, Gricius said that the three Baltic states have prepared a joint statement on the changes in the deployment of Russia's military forces, allowing Russia to increase its military hardware on Latvia's border. The statement was prepared in Riga on 14 June.

Giving an overall view on cooperation between the three Baltic states, he said that some signs of life are beginning to appear. This is indicated by the latest meeting of prime ministers in Vilnius and economic agreements.

Algirdas Gricius voiced his regret at the news conference that the U.S. first lady Hillary Clinton will not visit Lithuania on her visit to Eastern and Central Europe. He wondered how this fact will affect more than 700,000 voters of Lithuanian extraction in the U.S. presidential elections.

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